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NOTES AND COMMENTS

The executives for 1939-1940 of the editorial staff of the NORTH
CAROLINA LAW REVIEW are: Frank Thomas Miller, Jr., editor-in-chief

;

Elizabeth Shewmake, associate editor; Nathaniel G. Sims, book review editor. They are likewise the recipients of the faculty research
assistantships for the current academic year.
Because they stood among the highest ten per cent of their class in
point of scholarship, the following students were elected last spring to
the honorary law school society of the Order of the Coif: Robert C.
Howison, Jr., Moses B. Gillam, Jr., and Clarence A. Griffin, Jr.
Visiting professors in the 1939 summer session of the Law School
included: Breck P. McAllister, of the University of Washington, who
gave the course in Administrative Law; Walter Wheeler Cook, of
Northwestern University, who taught Conflict of Laws; Alexander H.
Frey, of the University of Pennsylvania, who gave the course in Labor
Law; and Richard R. B. Powell, of Columbia University, who taught
the course in Trusts.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Bankruptcy-Receiverships-Insolvency-Corporate ReorganizationPower of Indenture Trustee to Act on Behalf of Bondholders.
In a proceeding for corporate reorganization under Section 77B of
the Bankruptcy Act,' the circuit court of appeals 2 reversed the district
court's confirmation of a plan of reorganization which had been approved by a two-thirds majority of those bondholders who had filed
and voted their claims individually. The circuit court held that under
Section 77B in computing the amount of claims, two-thirds of which
must be represented by the assenting bondholders, the amount of claims
filed by the indenture trustee are included as well as those filed by the
individual bondholders, and that for the purpose of filing written acceptances no distinction is made between those claims filed by the
indenture trustee, and allowed, and those filed by the individual creditor
or someone expressly authorized to file them. On this basis the plan
did not have the requisite number of acceptances and could not be confirmed by the court.
The usefulness of the deed of trust in corporation finance lies largely
in the concert of action which may be obtained by concentration of
power in the trustee to act in preserving the interests of the bondholders
as a whole, which at the same time avoids the danger of overwhelming
the debtor with a multiplicity of suits.3 In the usual indenture the
"48
STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. A. §207 (1934).
'In re Kenilworth Bldg. Corporation, 105 F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
'Note (1927) 27 COL. L. REV. 443.
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bondholder is a secured creditor, 4 recognized as the obligee of the bond
which he holds; while the trustee, deriving 'his powers from the deed
of trust, is the party responsible for the protection of the bondholder's
interests under the covenants of the indenture. The extent to which a
trustee has a right to act in connection with trust property is a problem
which presents itself to the courts in varying degrees of complexity,
depending upon the particular case and the powers therein sought to be
exercised by the trustee. 5 Among the problems most frequently arising
are those concerned with the power of the trustee to: (1) file an aggregate claim in reorganization and liquidation proceedings on behalf of
the bondholders secured by the indenture, (2) vote on a proposed plan
of corporate reorganization, (3) bind the bondholders by his consent
to the issuance of prior lien receivership certificates, (4) bid in the property for the benefit of the bondholders. The protection remaining to
the bondholders when the trustee exceeds the scope of his authority is
likewise closely related to these problems.
Whether or not an indenture trustee holds such title as will permit
him to file a claim on behalf of all the creditors secured by the indenture
is a question which has caused much confusion. It will be conceded
that ordinarily the proper party to file the claim is the individual holder
of the bond giving rise to the obligation of the maker. If the indenture
expressly authorizes the trustee to file the claims, this provision will be
given effect.0 If the indenture contains no provision which can be interpreted to give the trustee such power, many courts hold that the
power will not be implied T for the reason that since the debt is evidenced
'it re U. S. Leatheroid & Rubber Co., 285 Fed. 884 (D. Mass. 1923); In re
Indiana Flooring Co., 53 F. (2d) 263 (S. D. N. Y. 1931); see note (1927) 27
COL. L. REv. 443, 444.
' See Moss Tie Co. v. Wabash Ry., 11 F. Supp. 277, 283 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
'it re International Match Corp., 3 F. Supp. 445 (S. D. N. Y. 1932) ; Spitz
v. Fox Metropolitan Playhouses, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 606 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
'United States Trust Co. v. Gordon, 216 Fed. 929 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914) (bankruptcy case -which decided only that the trustee was not entitled to file aggregate
claims where bondholders had already acted) ; In re U. S. Leatheroid & Rubber
Co., 285 Fed. 884 (D. Mass. 1923) (bankruptcy case where the trustee was not
permitted to file claims even though bonds were made payable to trustee or bolder,
the court holding that the debt was represented only by the bond itself) ; Fitkin
v. Century Oil Co., 16 F. (2d) 22 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) (receivership action in
which the mortgage deed giving the trustee power "to take all steps needful for
the protection and enforcement of rights of the trustee and holders of the notes
hereby secured", was deemed insufficient to allow trustee to file the aggregate of
the claims); it re Indiana Flooring Co., 53 F. (2d) 263 (S. D. N. Y. 1931)
(bankruptcy proceeding in which the court emphasized the clause in the indenture
to the effect that nothing contained therein should affect the rights of the bondholders) ; it re Prudence Bonds Corp., 16 F. Supp. 324 (E. D. N. Y. 1936) (a
proceeding in bankruptcy in which the court held that the trustee relationship was
not sufficient to constitute the trustee a creditor and thus allow him to file the
aggregate claim). See Mackey v. Randolph Macon Coal Co., 178 Fed. 881, 884
(C. C. A. 8th, 1910) ; it re A. J. Ellis, Inc., 242 Fed. 156, 158 (D. N. J. 1917) ;
Seaboard Nat. Bank v. Rogers Milk Products Co., 21 F. (2d) 414, 418 (1927).
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by the bond itself, an instrument entirely separate and distinct from the
deed of trust, and that since the trustee is neither the holder of the bond
nor its owner, he is, in the absence of express authority to the contrary,
in no position to claim against the corporation as its creditor. For this
reason, in the more usual situation there is included in the indenture
a clause giving the trustee the express power to prove claims ;8 or a
clause to the effect that the interest and principal of the secured indebtedness are payable to the trustee in case of default, thereby implying that power in a manner which the courts will recognize. 9 Where
the trustee is allowed to file the claims, then, unless his power is specified
in the indenture to be exclusive, the bondholders also have the right to
file their own claims. Duplication of claims is avoided by reducing the
trustee's claim pro tanto as the individual bondholders file their own
claims.Y0 The inclusion in the indenture of a specific clause allowing
the trustee to file a claim on behalf of all the creditors secured by the
indenture or a clause from which the courts will imply this power,
would seem to be practical, as well as equitable, considering the fact
that many individual holders cannot be located or notified in the relatively short time allowed for filing claims in bankruptcy proceedings,
equity receiverships, and other forms of reorganizations.
However, where this power to file claims is vested in a trustee it
In
does not imply a like power to vote on a plan of reorganization.'
filing claims he has acted as an authorized agent of the bondholders,
8See note 6, supra.
Continental-Equitable Title & Trust Co. v. National Properties Co., 273 Fed.
967 (D.Del. 1921) (receivership action in which it was held that the title of the
bondholders was defeasible and terminated on default, at 'which time title and
right to make demand passed to the trustee) ; In re United Cigar Stores Co., 68
F. (2d) 895 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) (bankruptcy proceeding in which the deed of
trust stipulated that payment shall be made "only" to the trustee) ; In re Paramount Publix Corp., 72 F. (2d) 219 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) (bankruptcy proceeding
where the right of the trustee to file was based on the terms of the indenture
which stated that payment should be made to the trustee) ; In re Allied Owners'
Corp., 74 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) (77B proceeding where the trustee
under the indenture was given the power, in case of default, to proceed to enforce
the rights of the bondholders) ; National Milling & Chemical Co., Inc. v. Amalgamated Laundries, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. N. Y. 1934) (receivership proceedings in which the trustee under the covenants of the indenture and in his
representative capacity was conceded the right to file claims) ; In re James Butler
Grocery Co., 21 F. Supp. 149 (E. D. N. Y. 1937) (bankruptcy proceeding where
under the terms of the indenture the trustee was given the right to act upon
default) ; Central Nat. Bank of Philadelphia v. Bateman &.Co., Inc., 15 Del. Ch.
31, 131
AtI. 202 (1925).
"0In re United Cigar Stores Co., 68 F. (2d) 895 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); In re
Associated Telephone Co., 12 F. Supp. 468 (S.D. N. Y. 1935) ; Gochenour v.
Griever, 295 Ill. App. 366, 15 N. E. (2d) 26 (1938); 2 GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
(1936) §744.
11
In re Allied Owners' Corp., 74 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) ; Blumgart
v. St. Louis S. F. Ry., 94 F. (2d) 712 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938); In re Kenilworth
Bldg. Corp., 105 F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) ; note (1935) 2 U. oF CHL L.
REv. 644.
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and at no time has he gained the status of an independent creditor of
the company; his position was developed for duties of a fiduciary and
administrative nature, and at no time was it within the intent of the
parties to place the trustee in a policy-forming position. 12 The courts
have refused to allow the contract between the corporation and the
bondholders to be impaired or changed materially without their consent.' 3 Therefore, this action by the trustee would not bind the bondholders since it exceeds the scope of his authority.' 4 It has been suggested,' 5 however, that at least a provision in the indenture should be
made for allowing the trustee to vote for absent bondholders.
The problem of the respective powers of the trustee or the bondholders to vote on a plan of reorganization arises in reorganizations
under the National Bankruptcy Act. Under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act' it was necessary to have the affirmative acceptance of twothirds of the claims allowed. In such cases it has been said that it was
customary to get the acceptance of two-thirds of the entire issue whether
the claims were filed by the bondholders or the trustee.'L The question
would then be important whether the acceptance by the trustee could
be counted in making up the two-thirds. The Chandler Act, which
replaces Section 77B with Chapter X,' s makes specific provision for
such a situation. It provides that the trustee shall have the power to
file claims for all holders who have not acted, but "... that in computing
the majority necessary for the acceptance of the plan only the claims
filed by the holders thereof, and allowed, shall 'be included." The language of the statute would, therefore, lead us to believe that in the
future claims must be filed by the individual bondholder in order to
allow his claim to be considered in computing the necessary majorities,
or to allow him to vote on the plan of reorganization.'"
The claims
filed by the trustee are kept alive by the filing, however, so these holders
(1935) 2 U. oF Cin. L. REV. 644; see Bitker v. Hotel Duluth Co., 83
F. (2d) 721, 723 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936).
In re Allied Owners' Corp., 74 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) ; note (1935)
33 MicH. L. REV. 1101; see Bitker v. Hotel Duluth Co., 83 F. (2d) 721, 723
(C. C. A. 8th, 1936).
I'Palmer v. Bankers' Trust Co., 12 F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Hollister v. Stewart, 111 N. Y. 644, 19 N. E. 782 (1889) ; Sturges v. Knapp, 31 Vt. 1
(1858); see Werner, Harris & Buck v. Equitable Trust Co., 35 F. (2d) 513, 514
(C. C. A. 10th, 1929) ; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Robin, 361 Ill.
261, 267, 198
N. E. 4, 8 (1935). Cf. Allen v. Moline Plow Co., 14 F. (2d) 912 (C. C. A. 8th,
1926).
15
Note (1935) 2 U. OF Cnx. L. RFv. 644.
1048 STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. A. §207 (1934).
1 Brief for Appellants, p. 20, In re Kenilworth
Bldg. Corp., 105 F. (2d) 673
(C. C. A. 7th, 1939). The phrase relied on in 77B(e) (1), "whose claims have
been allowed", would seem to make no distinction In the persons who filed them.
1852 STAT. 893, 11 U. S. C. A. §598 (Supp. 1938).
1In
re Genesse Valley Gas Co., Inc. (S. D. N. Y. 1939), C. C. H. Bankr.
Serv. 12808 (1939).
1"Note
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have some measure of protection since the court will look to the fairness
of the proposed plan to the non-voting security holders before confirm20
ing it.
The issuance of prior lien receivership certificates for a private company raises an analogous problem where such an issue requires the
consent of the bondholders before the certificates are given priority
over the secured bond issue.21 The great majority of the cases hold
that the ordinary deed of trust does not contemplate, under a reasonable construction of the general power to protect the bonds, that the
authority to give consent shall vest in the trustee22 either by direct
action on his part,23 or by his inaction in the face of notice of the re24
ceivership proceeding.
Relatively few cases have come to the courts for a consideration of
the right of the trustee, in the absence of a governing provision in the
instrument, to bid for the property at the foreclosure sale on behalf of
the bondholders. These cases show a well divided split of authority
with excellent authority on both sides. Led by Nay Aug Lumber Co.
v. Scranton Trust Co.,2 5 some courts hold that the trustee has the
implied power to bid for the property for the bondholders as part of
his duty to protect the security, bidding for it an amount up to the
amount of the bonds, and, if it is thereby bid in for the amount of the
bonded indebtedness, giving each bondholder an undivided interest in
the property. 26 The principal advantage which the courts recognize in
this Pennsylvania rule of implied power of the trustee arises from the
well known fact that property sold under a foreclosure seldom brings a
price anywhere nearly commensurate with its true value. Therefore,
it would seem more in the contemplation of the makers of the instruSee 3 Gmuns, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS §1124.
Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Greene & Sons Corp., 50 R. I. 305, 146
Atl. 765 (1929) ; Koester v. Citizens' Publishing Co., 154 S. C. 144, 151 S. E. 452
(1930) ; see Clifford v. West Hartford Creamery Co., 103 Vt. 229, 234, 153 Atl.
205, 211 (1931); note (1926) 40 A. L. R. 244.
I'Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Centralia & C. Ry., 96 Fed. 636 (C. C. A. 7th,
1899) ; Bernard v. Union Trust Co., 159 Fed. 620 (C. C. A. 4th, 1908) ; Nowell
v. International Trustee Co., 169 Fed. 497 (C. C. A. 9th, 1909); Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Co. v. Greene & Sons Corp., 50 R. I. 305, 146 Atl. 765 (1929).
20
2

Contra: In re Quemahoning Creek Coal Co., 15 F. (2d) 58 (W. D. Pa. 1926).
23 See Koester v. Citizens' Publishing Co., 154 S. C. 154, 197, 151 S. E. 452,
4672 (1930).
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Centralia Ry., 96 Fed. 636 (C. C. A. 7th,
1899) ; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Greene & Sons Corp., 50 R. I. 305,
146 Atl. 765 (1929).
" 240 Pa. 500, 87 At. 843 (1913).
" Hoffman v. First Bond & Mortgage Co. of Hartford, 116 Conn. 320, 164
Atl. 656 (1933) ; First Nat. Bank in Wichita v. Neil, 137 Kan. 436, 20 P. (2d)
528 (1933) ; Krieger v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 260 Ky. 1, 83 S. W. (2d) 850
(1935); Rogers v. Wheeler, 2 Lans. 486 (N. Y. 1870); Nay Aug Lumber Co.
v. Scranton Trust Co., 240 Pa. 500, 87 Atl. 843 (1913); see Straus v. Chicago
Title & Trust Co., 273 Ill. App. 63, 67 (1933) ; Silver v. Wichfield Farms, 209
Iowa 857, 861, 227 N. W. 97, 99 (1929).
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ment that the trustee should continue his protection of the bondholders'
interest to save them from severe losses. But other courts2 7 are unwilling to impair the rights of the bondholders who, in case of default,
are entitled to a foreclosure sale and their pro rata share of the proceeds
in cash. These courts, following the federal rule, 'hold that it is impossible, in the absence of authorization in the indenture, to bind unwilling bondholders to the hazards of possible subsequent loss in case
it turns out that later the property cannot be sold for as much as it
would have brought if sold outright at the time of the foreclosure,
instead of being bid in for the bondholders. For this reason, a Michigan statute giving the trustee power to bid in on the trust property
was declared unconstitutional. 28 Fortunately, this difficulty is usually
avoided by express provisions in the deed of trust giving the trustee
the power to bid for the property, which provisions are held to be valid
29
and binding on the bondholders.
Bondholders, as individuals or as a class, are not entirely at the
mercy of the trustee where he has authority to represent them. The
rule of representation of bondholders by the trustee is a rule of convenience and continues only during the exercise of a fair and just
representation. 0 Thus, if the trustee, at any time, refuses to act on
behalf of the bondholders, conditions of the trust having been met, or if
he proves himself hostile or his conduct proves prejudicial to the interests
of the bondholders, the rule is put aside.8 1 If such an adverse position
of the trustee is proved, the bondholders may then represent themselves
in proceedings such as these discussed, regardless of any clause in the
82
deed of trust giving power to the trustee to act on their behalf.
C. JOHNSON.
Werner, Harris & Buck v. Equitable Trust Co., 35 F. (2d) 513 (C. C. A.
10th, 1929) ; Cosmopolitan Hotel Co. v. Colorado Nat. Bank of Denver, 96 Colo.
62, 40 P. (2d) 245 (1934) ; Sanxey v. Iowa City Glass Co., 63 Iowa 707, 17 N. W.
429 (1883) ; Bradley v. Tyson, 33 Mich. 337 (1876) ; Detroit Trust Co. v. Stormfeltz-Loveley Co., 257 Mich. 655, 242 N. W. 227 (1932) ; see Chicago Title & Trust
Co. v. Robin, 361 Ill.
App. 261, 265, 198 N. E. 4, 8 (1935).
2" Detroit Trust Co. v. Stormfeltz-Loveley Co., 257 Mich. 655, 242 N. W. 227
MARGARET

27

(1932) (a statute giving court power .to authorize trustee to bid in on the trust
property where not less than a majority of the bondholders requested it, was declared unconstitutional as impairing the contractual rights of the dissenters). But
see Heighe v. Sale of Real Estate, 164 Md. 259, 268, 164 Atl. 671, 676 (1933).
20 Sage v. Central R..R., 99 U. S. 334, 25 L. ed. 394 (1878) ; Smith v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 116 Fla. 390, 156 So. 498 (1934); Kitchen Bros.
Hotel Co. v. Omaha Safe Deposit Co., 126 Neb. 744, 254 N. W. 507 (1934).
00 See Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 66 Fed. 169, 174 (C. C.

E. D. Wis. 1895).
" Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 66 Fed. 169 (C. C. E. D.
Wis. 1895) ; Cochran v. Pittsburg S. & N. Ry., 150 Fed. 682 (W. D. N. Y. 1907) ;
Lowenthal v. Georgia Coast & P. Ry., 233 Fed. 1010 (S. D. Ga. 1916) ; Brown v.
Denver Omnibus Co., 254 Fed. 560 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918).
2 See note 31, supra.
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Constitutional Law-Eminent Domain-Tucker Act-Whiat
Constitutes a "Taking" Under the Fifth Amendment.
The United States, acting under the authority of the Mississippi
River Flood Control Act,' constructed dikes in the Mississippi River a
short distance above and opposite the appellants' land, in order to improve the navigation of the stream. The dikes deflected the current of
the river, washing away appellants' land, the elevation of which, prior
to the flooding, was such that the waters of the river did not hinder or
prevent its full and complete use as farming property. The appellants'
claim that the property had been "taken" within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was" dismissed by the district court, 2 and on appeal to the circuit court of appeals
the judgment was affirmed.3 The court based its decision on three
grounds: first, that the suit "sounded in tort", and, therefore, there
could be no recovery due to the limitations of the Tucker Act ;4 second,
that riparian ownership is subject to the obligation to suffer the consequences of the improvement of navigation in the exercise of the dominant right of the Government in that regard; and third, that there
was not an actual "taking" of private property for public use.
The Tucker Act precludes recovery against the United States in
either the Court of Claims or, as was attempted in the case in question,
in the district courts of the United States, for "injuries sounding in
tort". 5 If the plaintiffs recover, it must be upon an implied contract, 6
for, as stated in Tempel v. United States,7 ".... the law cannot imply a
promise by the Government to pay for a right over, or interest in, land
which right or interest the Government claimed and claims it possessed
before it utilized the same. If the Government's claim is unfounded, a
property right of the -plaintiff's is violated; but the cause of action, if
'Franklin v. United States, 16 F. Supp. 253 (W. D. Tenn. 1936).
'42 STAT. 1505 (1923), 33 U. S. C. A. §702a (1928).
Franklin v. United States, 101 F. (2d) 459 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939), cert. granted,
- U. S. -, 59 Sup. Ct. 834, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 812 (U. S. 1939).
'24 STAT. 505 (1887), 28 U. S. C. A. §§250(1), 41 (20) (1928).
'Hill v. United States, 149 U. S. 593, 13 Sup. Ct. 1011, 37 L. ed. 862 (1893);
Hijo v. United States, 194 U. S. 315, 24 Sup. Ct. 727, 48 L. ed. 994 (1904) (holding that if the action is, in fact in tort, the statute (Tucker Act) cannot be avoided
by framing the action in contract); Bigby v. United States, 188 U. S. 400, 23
Sup. Ct. 468, 47 L. ed. 519 (1903); Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U. S. 146,
44 Sup. Ct. 264, 68 L. ed. 608 (1924) ; Pendleton v. United States, 56 Ct. Cl. 222
(1921) ; Flynn v. United States, 65 Ct. C. 33 (1928).
'United States v. Russell, 13 Wall. 623, 20 L. ed. 474 (U. S. 1871); United
States v. Great Falls Manufacturing Co., 112 U. S. 645, 5 Sup. Ct. 316, 28 L. ed.
846 (1884) ; United States v. Palmer, 128 U. S. 262, 9 Sup. Ct. 104, 32 L. ed. 442
(1888). In all of these cases the United States appropriated private property for
public use. The important thing about these cases is that the officers who appropriated and used the property did not deny the plaintiffs' title.
'Tempel v. United States, 248 U. S. 121, 131, 39 Sup. Ct. 56, 59, 63 L. ed. 162,
165 (1918).
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any, is one sounding in tort, for which the Tucker Act affords no
remedy." When the Government claims title to the property, no contract arises ;8 but when it appropriates private property without asserting title, an implied contract to pay the owner the value of the land
arises, although no formal proceedings are instituted for the condemnation of the property. Nor is an express promise to pay necessary in
order that the plaintiff may bring suit, as the promise to pay is imposed
by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution."°
In several instances, compensation has been denied riparian owners
in suits against the United States on the theory that the riparian owner's
right to have the stream come to him in its natural condition, as against
the other individual riparian owners, is subject to the paramount power
of the United States to improve navigation, and that the "consequential"
injuries sustained as a result of the exercise of this power are noncompensable. l The courts invariably state, however, that if there has
been an actual "taking" of the property, even in the exercise of the
right to control navigation, compensation must be made to the riparian
12

owner.
8 Langford v. United States, 101 U. S. 341, 25 L. ed. 1010 (1880); Hill v.
United States, 149 U. S. 593, 13 Sup. Ct. 1011, 37 L. ed. 862 (1893) ; Bedford v.
United States, 192 U. S. 217, 24 Sup. Ct. 238, 48 L. ed. 414 (1904) ; Henry v.
United States, 38 Ct. Cl. 635 (1903) ; Peabody v. United States, 43 Ct. CI. 5
(1907); Andrus v. United States, 59 Ct. Cl. 851 (1924); Cadwalader v. United
States, 59 Ct. Cf. 533 (1924).
' United States v. Great Falls Manufacturing Co., 112 U. S. 645, 5 Sup. Ct. 306,
28 L. ed. 846 (1884) (taking property under legislative authority) ; Schillinger v.
United States, 155 U. S. 163, 15 Sup. Ct. 85, 39 L. ed. 108 (1894); Philippine
Sugar Estates Development Co. v. United States, 40 Ct. Cl. 33 (1904) ; Brooks v.
United States, 39 Ct. C1. 494 (1904). In the Brooks case the court extended the
doctrine to all property, stating: "It is settled law that where an officer of the
Government, having authority to act, takes or appropriates to public use property,
admitting it to be private, an implied contract will arise to make compensation.'

Id. at 502.

"0Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 54 Sup. Ct. 26, 78 L. ed. 142 (1933)
(damage caused by backwater from dam); United States v. Chicago B. and Q.
R. R., 82 F. (2d) 131 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936) ; Spoenbarger v. United States, 101
F. (2d) 506 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
"IGibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269, 17 Sup. Ct. 578, 41 L. ed. 996 (1897);
Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 21 Sup. Ct. 48, 45 L. ed. 126 (1900) ; Bedford
v. United States, 192 U. S. 217, 24 Sup. Ct 238, 48 L. ed. 414 (1904) ; United
States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53, 33 Sup. Ct. 667, 57
L. ed. 1063 (1913); Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U. S. 82, 33
Sup. Ct. 679, 57 L. ed. 1083 (1913) ; Jackson v. United States, 230 U. S. 1, 33
Sup. Ct. 1011, 57 L. ed. 1-363 (1913); Cubbins v. Mississippi River Comm., 241
U. S. 351, 36 Sup. Ct. 671, 61 L. ed. 1041 (1916).
12 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, 20 L. ed. 557 (U. S. 1871); United
States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 23 Sup. Ct. 349, 47 L. ed. 539 (1903); United
States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 37 Sup. Ct. 380, 61 L. ed. 756 (1917) ; Tompkins
v. United States, 45 Ct. C1. 66 (1910). Acco;ed: Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U. S. 312, 13 Sup. Ct. 622, 37 L. ed. 463 (1893) ; see Scranton
v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 153, 21 Sup. Ct. 48, 53, 45 L. ed. 126, 133 (1900), in
which the court stated that "undoubtedly compensation must be made or secured
to the owner when that which is to be done is to be regarded as a taking of private
property for public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the Con-
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The determination of whether there has been a compensable "taking", therefore, would seem to depend upon whether the damage resulting from the acts done by the Government is immediate and direct, or
merely "consequential". There is great difficulty in making such a determination, because, apparently, there are two divergent lines of authority in the cases decided by the United States Supreme Court, and,
in some particulars, the cases seem irreconcilable. The cases in which
compensation was denied present situations where the lands of the
plaintiffs were flooded by diversion of the current, in Bedford v. United
States'8 and Jackson v. United States,14 and where the plaintiff's boat

landing was rendered virtually useless by reason of the construction of
a dike and the lowering of the water level, in Gibson v. United States.15
In the latter case, there was no flooding of the plaintiff's land, but a
decrease in the value of the land due to a diversion away from rather
than over the land; the court held that riparian ownership is subject to
suffer the consequences of an improvement of navigation, and since the
injuries sustained were "consequential" to the lawful and proper exercise of a governmental power, no compensation would be allowed. In
the Bedford case, the Government constructed revetments along the
bank of the Mississippi River six miles upstream from the plaintiff's
land, and as a result of the construction of these revetments, the land
of the plaintiff was flooded some time later. The Court denied compensation on the ground that this was a "consequential" injury, and that
the purpose of the revetments was to prevent further erosion at the
point of construction. In the Jackson case, the Court held that the
Government is not liable to riparian owners for damages caused by
overflow or for failure to construct additional levees along the Mississippi River for the protection from the levees built at other points.
However, in this case, the appellants stated that there had been flooding
of the lands in question before the construction of the levees. Too, the
damage occurred over a period of twenty years, which would seem to
indicate that it was "consequential" rather than direct. These cases
appear to show that compensation will not be allowed when the injury
to the land comes about as a result of the diversion of the stream for the
purposes of improving navigation.
The cases in which compensation was awarded seem to show that
if the injury is a result of the water being thrown back upon the land
by the structure built in the aid of navigation, there is a "taking". In
stitution; and of course in its exercise of the power to regulate commerce, Congress
may not override the provision that just compensation must be made when private
property is taken for public use."
192 U. S. 217, 24 Sup. Ct. 238, 48 L. ed. 414 (1904).
14230 U. S.1, 33 Sup. Ct. 1011, 57 L. ed. 1363 (1913).
15166 U. S.269, 17 Sup. Ct. 578, 41 L. ed. 996 (1897).
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Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company,'0 the lands of the plaintiff were
overflowed because of a dam constructed downstream, and the court
hold that the flooding of the land, which previously was free from flooding, was direct, and therefore constituted a "taking". This case established the rule that there could not be a total destruction of property
without constituting a "taking", and that this would amount to an invasion of private right under the pretext of the public good. 17 In
United States v. L3yah18 it was held that there had been a "taking" of
the land, a rice plantation, when an overflow caused by the construction
of a dam turned the land into a useless bog. In the case of United
States v. Cress,'9 locks and dams were built by the Government in the
improvement of navigation, and the plaintiff's land was thereby subjected to intermittent floodings. Compensation was allowed here in
proportion to the decrease in tie value of the land, apparently indicating
that there does not have to be a complete destruction to constitute a
compensable "taking".
What, then, is the distinction? There seems to be only one possible
ground on which the Court relied in denying compensation in the Gibson,
Bedford, and Jackson cases, and that was that the Government could,
in the exercise of the right to control navigation, change the course of
the river, so long as no structure was built in the river which threw
water back upon the lands of the plaintiff. However, it is difficult to
see why an invasion caused by diversion of the river current should be
considered less "direct" than one caused by the backing up of the water.
The Court does not state a given rule or distinction, in any of the cases,
which will hold up in the light of other cases on the point. The Court
merely says that the injuries were "direct" and allow compensation, or
that they were "consequential" and deny compensation. What actually
constitutes a "taking" is apparently a matter of judicial discretion, incapable of exact definition.
S. 1871).
166,adopted
20 L. ed.a 557
"
13 Wall.
attitude, stating, "It would be a very
very(U.liberal
Court
" The
curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing a provision of the constitutional

law, always understood to have been adopted for protection and security to the
rights of the individual as against the government, and which has received the
commendation of jurists, statesmen, and commentators as placing the just prin-

ciples of the common law on that subject beyond the power of ordinary legislation
to change or control them, it shall be held that if the government refrains from
the absolute conversion 6f real property to the uses of the public it can destroy
its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, because, in the narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken for -the public use. Such
a construction would pervert the constitutional provision into a restriction upon
the rights of the citizen, as those rights stood at the common law, instead of the
government, and make it an authority for the invasion of private right under the
pretext of the public good which had no warrant in the laws or practices of our
20 L.-ed. at 560.
ancestors." Id. at 177,
1 188 U. S. 445, 23 Sup. Ct. 349, 47 L. ed. 539 (1903).
18243 U. S.316, 37 Sup. Ct. 380, 61 L. ed. 746 (1917).
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It would seem that the statement made by the Court in Transportation Company v. Chicago20 to the effect that the right of the public in
regard to navigation extends to the natural state of the stream, and that
beyond that property cannot be taken without compensation being made
to the owners, would seem more just and equitable than the rule that
the Government may divert the course of the stream as much as desired
-even over land that has never been flooded before, as in the principal
case. As pointed out by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit,21 in some instances there has been added to the word "taken"
the words "or damaged". This suggestion, if followed, would allow the
property owner to recover damages when the land was not actually
appropriated for the public use, but seriously damaged for the public
use.
Due to the diversity of reasoning advanced in the cases cited and
commented on in this note, and due to the inconsistent and sometimes
inequitable results reached, it is suggested that the federal courts might
well adopt the test applied by some of the state courts in determining
whether there is a "taking", e.g., if the property has been "damaged"
for a public use this injury is compensable. This is provided for by
statute in most cases. 22 However, it must be borne in mind that property
is not "taken" when it is destroyed by the state to protect the public
interest, under the police power. 23 The state takes property by eminent
domain because it is useful to the public, and destroys it under the police
power because it is harmful. "Appropriation can be necessary only
where possession is of positive value to the public, and if so, there is
really a case of eminent domain." 24 It would seem that the land in the
instant case was put to a -public use, and not destroyed because of its
harmful nature.
Even if this test is not adopted, an exception should be made when
it is inevitable that the plaintiff suffer complete destruction of the property as a result of the improvement of navigation, where there is no
claim to the land by the Government, if his lands were free from flooding prior to the construction of the dike. One person should not be
compelled to bear the brunt of the injuries, when the public as a whole
is benefited.
HAL HAMMER WALKER.
0 99
1

U. S. 635, 25 L. ed. 336 (U. S. 1897).
United States v. Chicago B. and Q. R. R., 82 F. (2d) 131 (C. C. A. 8th,

1936).

" James Poultry Co. v. Nebraska City, 284 N. W. 273 (Neb. 1939) ; Harrison

v. Louisiana Highway Comm., 186 So. 354 (La. 1939); Guaranty Savings and
Loan Association v. City of Springfield, 113 S. W. (2d) 147 (Mo. App. 1938)
note (1936) 13 VA. L. REv. 334.
24

Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U. S.16, 25 L. ed. 981 (U. S.1880).
FREUND, POLICE POWER

(1904) 547.
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Constitutional Law-Privilege Tax-Temporary Use of Rooms folr
Solicitation of Sales in Interstate Commerce.
A North Carolina statute imposes an annual privilege tax of $250
upon "Every person, firm, or corporation, not being a regular retail
merchant in the state of North Carolina, who shall display samples,
goods, wares, or merchandise in any hotel room, or in any house rented
or occupied temporarily, for the purpose of securing orders for the retail sale of such goods, wares, or merchandise so displayed ...... Plaintiff,
a New York corporation, rented for several days a room in a WinstonSalem hotel for the display of samples, and thereby secured retail
orders for merchandise to be shipped from New York. Since plaintiff
was not a regular retail merchant in the state, a tax was assessed against
it under this statute. In an action to recover the tax paid under protest,
the Court held that this was not a direct and undue burden on interstate
commerce, but that the activity was a preliminary and incidental one
which transpired prior to the beginning of the flow of events which constitutes the movement of goods in interstate commerce.2
A tax imposed by a state, or a municipal subdivision thereof, may
be invalidated as an improper exercise of power with respect to interstate commerce by reason of the fact either that the tax discriminates
against the citizens or products of another state s or that the tax imposes a direct burden upon a transaction in interstate commerce. 4 The
purpose of the statute in the principal case, and the actual result of its
application, may be to discriminate against wares displayed by extrastate merchants, but the act is not so phrased. Its language, taken
literally, imposes -the tax upon the privilege of displaying any wares,
regardless of their origin.5
The Supreme Court of the United States has, in numerous decisions,
0
beginning with the case of Robbins v,. Shelby County Taxing District,
held consistently that a license or privilege tax upon persons soliciting
orders for goods to be shipped in interstate commerce is a direct burden
' N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §7880 (51) (e) (a subsequent section
provides that a like levy may be imposed by the county or municipality wherein
the activity takes place).
& Co. v. Maxwell, 216 N. C. 114, 3 S. E. (2d) 292 (1939).
'Best
3
Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123, 26 L. ed. 103 (1880) ; O'Connell v. Kontojohn, 131 Fla. 783, 179 So. 802 (1938).
'Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489, 7 Sup. Ct. 592, 30
L. ed. 694 (1887).
' But it would seem that the provision of the statute which excludes all regular
retail merchants in the state might be susceptible of the construction that it exempts every resident of North Carolina, because, by engaging in the taxed activity
he necessarily becomes a regular retail merchant in the state. The adoption of
such a construction would seem to result in discrimination against non-residents.
"120 U. S. 489, 7 Sup. Ct. 592, 30 L. ed. 694 (1887).
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upon such commerce, 7 even though the seller has a fixed place of business in the state where the orders are solicited. 8
Without finding any direct authority to sustain the tax, the North
Carolina court relied largely upon the recent trend by the judiciary
toward a ". . . broadening of the states' taxing power over matters

touching the fringe of the garment of interstate commerce." As pointed
out in a recent law review article,' 0 this trend has been especially pronounced in sales and use tax cases.

In Helson v. Kentucky," an early

use tax case, the United States Supreme Court declared that a state may
not tax the use of an article employed in interstate commerce. However, in subsequent decisions, this rule has been greatly relaxed to permit the levy of taxes imposing as great a burden upon interstate
commerce. The Court has upheld a license tax on the business of selling gasoline 12 and a privilege tax upon the sale, storage, or distribution
of gasoline, where the purchasers and the owners made use of it solely
in interstate commerce.' 3 A tax upon the privilege of transporting
motor vehicles over the highways for resale' 4 and a tax upon goods
brought into the state to be installed upon interstate transportation
equipment' 5 have also been sustained. These taxes were held not to be
a direct burden on interstate commerce, for they were imposed upon
'Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S.489, 7 Sup. Ct. 592, 30
L. ed. 694 (1887) ; Corson v. Maryland, 120 U. S. 502, 7 Sup. Ct. 655, 30 L. ed.
699 (1887) ; Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S.129, 9 Sup. Ct. 1, 32 L. ed. 368 (1888);
Stoutenburg v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141, 9 Sup. Ct. 256, 32 L. ed. 637 (1889);
Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S.289, 14 Sup. Ct. 829, 38 L. ed. 719 (1894) ; Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U. S.27, 22 Sup. Ct. 576, 46 L. ed. 785 (1902); Caldwell v.
North Carolina, 187 U. S.622, 23 Sup. Ct. 229, 47 L. ed. 336 (1903); Norfolk &
Western R. R. v. Sims, 191 U. S.441, 24 Sup. Ct. 151, 48 L. ed. 254 (1903);
Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S.507, 27 Sup. Ct. 159, 51 L. ed. 295 (1906) ;
Dozier v. Alabama, 218 U. S.124, 30 Sup. Ct. 649, 54 L. ed. 965 (1910) ; Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U. S.389, 33 Sup. Ct. 294, 57 L. ed. 565 (1913) ; Rogers
v. Arkansas, 227 U. S. 401, 33 Sup. Ct. 298, 57 L. ed. 569 (1913); Stewart v.
Michigan, 232 U. S.665, 34 Sup. Ct. 476, 58 L. ed. 786 (1914) ; Davis v. Virginia,
236 U. S. 697, 35 Sup. Ct. 479, 59 L. ed. 795 (1915); Western Oil Refining Co.
v. Lipscomb; 244 U. S.346, 37 Sup. Ct. 623, 61 L. ed. 1181 (1917) ; Real Silk
Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U. S.325, 45 Sup. Ct. 525, 69 L. ed. 982 (1925).
But cf. Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing Dist, 145 U. S.1, 12 Sup. Ct. 810, 36
L. ed. 601 (1892).
' Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U. S.27, 22 Sup. Ct 576, 46 L. ed. 785 (1902);
Heyman v. Hays, 236 U. S.178, 35 Sup. Ct. 403, 59 L. ed. 527 (1915).
'Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 216 N. C. 114, 118, 3 S.E. (2d) 292, 296 (1939).
10 Warren and Schlesinger, Sales and Use Taxes: Interstate Commerce Pays
Its Way (1938) 38 COL. L. Rav. 49.
11279 U. S.245, 49 Sup. Ct. 279, 73 L. ed. 683 (1929).

"Eastern Air Transport v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 285 U. S.147, 52
Sup. Ct. 340. 76 L. ed. 673 (1932).
"Nashville, C.& St. L. R. R. v. Wallace, 288 U. S.249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345, 77
L. ed. 730 (1933) ; Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, 289 U. S.249, 53 Sup. Ct.
591, 77 L. ed. 1155 (1933).
"Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U. S.407, 56 Sup. Ct. 756, 80 L. ed. 1245 (1936).
Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, - U. S. -, 59 Sup. Ct. 389, 83 L. ed.
Adv. Ops. 352 (1939); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gallagher, - U. S. -, 59
Sup. Ct. 396, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 369 (1939).
15
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property which had not yet begun or had ceased to be used in interstate
commerce. 6 The so-called compensating use taxes reach the same result, economically, as the imposition of a tax upon the interstate sale
itself, since the very purpose of the tax is to destroy the advantage of
buying tax-free goods in a state having no sales tax.17 The approval
given to such taxes by the courts represents not only a modification of
the rule as to what constitutes a direct burden on interstate commerce,
but also as to what constitutes discrimination against such commerce.
The Court in the instant case sought to liken the activity of the
plaintiff to an incident transpiring before interstate commerce began,
and relied upon the trend of the judiciary to declare such preliminary
action as separable from the interstate transaction itself. But, by the
very terms of the statute, the activity subjected to the tax was the actual
solicitation of orders for an interstate sale, which has been held to be a
part of the commerce itself, and not preliminary to, or separable from,
8
such commerce.'
Conceding the fact that the courts have materially expanded their
definitions of what constitutes activity prior or subsequent to, and
separable from, the interstate transaction itself, could a state impose a
tax upon billboard advertisements of a product which could be bought
only from an extrastate seller, or upon the display of goods by an agent
who had not the power to take orders, or upon the distribution of samples of goods with order blanks attached? An affirmative answer to
these questions may find some support in the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue,'9
where it held valid a privilege tax based upon the gross receipts from
the sale of advertising space by newspapers and magazines where some
of the advertisements were procured from extrastate advertisers and
the publication was circulated in interstate commerce.
The Court sought further to sustain the levy upon the ground that
it is a "use tax" imposed upon the use of North Carolina property.
The tax cannot properly be classified as a "use tax", for it is a tax upon
the interstate commerce itself rather than upon the use of property
prior or subsequent to its employment in interstate commerce. Furthermore, the tax cannot be designated as a "use tax" for the reason that the
"' In these cases the 'court expressly found that there was no discrimination
against interstate commerce, either because the levy was upon all property of that
class within the state, or, if it was an imposition upon property purchased in an
extra-state market, because the use tax was complemental to the state sales tax.
S7An able discussion of sales and use taxes is embodied in Warren & Schlesinger, loc. cit. supra note 10.
18

Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S.489, 497, 7 Sup. Ct. 592,
(where the court said: ". . . to tax the sale of such
goods, or the offer to sell them, before they are brought into the state, .... seems
to us clearly a tax on interstate commerce itself").
" 303 U. S.250, 58 Sup. Ct. 546, 82 L. ed. 823 (1938).
596, 30 L. ed. 694, 697 (1887)
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classification upon which the tax is based is the use of the room for the
purpose of displaying goods and securing orders for interstate sales;
and, therefore, the tax is, in reality, one upon the privilege of selling
rather than upon the privilege of use.
The tax having been shown to fall within the classification of a
privilege tax, 20 the rule laid down in the Robbins case 2 1 and its successors22 would seem applicable to invalidate it as being a direct and
undue burden upon interstate commerce. Recent decisions have modified the rule of the Robbins case as to what constitutes an interstate
sale. Banker Brothers v. Pennsylvania2 3 apparently limited the application of the rule to cases where the out-of-state manufacturer or his
agent makes the sale; and Wiloil Corporationv. Pennsylvania held that
to constitute an interstate sale the contract must require interstate transportation. 24 Despite the modifications embodied in these decisions it
seems that the principal case does not fall within their scope, and must,
therefore, be governed by the rule as originally laid down. The Su25
preme Court in so recent a case as Southern Pacific v. Gallagher,
citing the Robbins case, reiterated the rule that "A license tax on sales
by samples burdens one selling only goods from other states."
. MARSHALL V. YOUNT.

Federal Jurisdiction-Courts-Acquiring Jurisdiction by
Attachment of Nonresident's Property and
Constructive Service.
Originating with Toland v. Sprague,' an unbroken line of Supreme
Court decisions 2 have decreed that a federal court cannot acquire original jurisdiction over a nonresident of the district in which the court is
20 The Revenue
Act of 1937, of which this tax is a part, classifies it as a
privilege tax.
-" Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489, 7 Sup. Ct. 592, 30
L. ed. 694 (1887).

22

See note 7, supra.

(Banker Bros. of Pennsylvania kept no cars in stock, but sold by the use of demonstrators' cars manufactured in New York. Purchasers contracted with Banker Bros. to buy cars
and pay the freight from New York, and received a warranty from the manufacturer. Banker Bros. accepted the drafts drawn on them by the manufacturer,
received the cars, and delivered them -to the purchasers. The Pennsylvania 2%
general sales tax was held applicable to such sales).
24 294 U. S. 169, 55 Sup. Ct. 358, 79 L. ed. 838 (1935)
(a tax'of 3 cents per
gallon on fuels sold and delivered by distributors in Pennsylvania was held to
apply to a Pennsylvania corporation taking orders through agents and shipping
from Delaware to purchasers in Pennsylvania); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. McGoldrick,
279 N. Y. 184, 18 N. E. (2d) 25 (1938) (to the same effect).
25
-U. S. -, -, 59 Sup. Ct. 389, 392, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 352, 355 (1939).
112 Pet. 300, 9 L. ed. 1093 (U,. S. 1836).
2
Ex parte Des Moines & M. Ry., 103 U. S. 794, 26 L. ed. 461 (1880) ; Laborde
v. Ubarri, 214 U. S. 173, 29 Sup. Ct. 552, 53 L. ed. 955 (1909); Big Vein Coal
Co. v. Read, 229 U. S. 31, 33 Sup. Ct. 694, 57 L. ed. 1053 (1913).
2222 U. S. 210, 32 Sup. Ct. 38, 56 L. ed. 168 (1911)
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sitting by attaching his property within the district and serving him
only constructively, at least where the cause of action is a purely personal 6ne ;3 but that attachment is an ancillary proceeding, available
only when jurisdiction in personant is acquired by personal service or
4
a general appearance.
Contrary to this restriction is the practice common to the state
courts whereby, pursuant to statutory authorization, property of a nonresident defendant may be attached although the defendant is served
only constructively.5 The constitutional validity of such procedure has
not been seriously doubted since the decision of Pennoyer v. Neff.0
Sanction was found in the state's jurisdiction over all property within
its boundaries for the state court's judgment against the property
seized, although the judgment had no efficacy beyond that. 7 Constructive service was deemed sufficient notice to the defendant when coupled
with the presumptive notice resulting from seizure of his property by
attachment.

8

Recent developments tend to spotlight the history of the federal
position. Closely adhering to a prior circuit court decision, 9 the United
States Supreme Court, in Toland v. Sprague, laid down the following
' But where the cause of action is purely in ren, e.g., to enforce a claim to
property rather than to enforce a personal obligation against the defendant, a
federal district court has jurisdiction to proceed against property lying within its
district although a nonresident defendant is served only constructively. This
authority arises from 18 STAT. 472 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §118 (1934), which embraces two classes of cases: (1) Suits to enforce any legal or equitable lien upon,
or claim to, real or personal property within the district; (2) suits to remove any
encumbrance or lien or cloud upon the title to such property.
The doctrine set forth in Toland v. Sprague has been followed in a host of
lower federal court decisions. Richmond v. Drefous, 20 Fed. Cas. No. 11,799
(C. C. D. R. I. 1831); Day v. Newark India Rubber Mfg. Co., 7 Fed. Cas. No.
3,685 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1850); Chittenden v. Darden, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,688
(C. C. N. D. Ga. 1875); Anderson v. Shaffer, 10 Fed. 266 (C. C. S. D. Ohio
1881) ; Boston Electric Co. v. Electric Gas Lighting Co., 23 Fed. 838 (C. C. D.
Mass. 1885); Noyes v. Canada, 30 Fed. 665 (C. C. D. Kan. 1887); Perkins v.
1-indryx, 40 Fed. 657 (C. C. D. Mass. 1889) ; Lackett v. Rumbaugh, 45 Fed. 23
(C. C. V. D. N. C. 1891): Bucyrus Co. v. McArthur, 219 Fed. 266 (M. D. Tenn.
1914); Cleveland & W. Coal Co. v. J. H. Hillman & Sons Co., 245 Fed. 200
(N. D. Ohio 1917).
; An extensive collection of state decisions construing their respective statutes,
which permit constructive service on a nonresident defendant, is found in 9 RosE's
NOTES Ox UNITED STATES REPORTS (rev. ed.
2 RosE's NOTES ON UNITED STATES REPORTS

1918) 1115-1120, as supplemented by
(Supp. 1932) 702-704.

' 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877) ; see Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. & Imp.
Co., 130 U. S. 559, 563. 9 Sup. Ct. 603, 605, 32 L. ed. 1045, 1048 (1890) ; Arndt
v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 323, 10 Sup. Ct. 557, 561, 33 L. ed. 918, 920 (1890);
Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, 405, 20 Sup. Ct. 410, 412, 44 L. ed. 520, 523 (1900)
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 393, 34 Sup. Ct. 779, 782, 58 L. ed. 1363, 1368
(1914).
Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308. 19 L. ed. 931 (U. S. 1870) ; Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877) ; Clark v. Wells, 203 U. S. 164, 27 Sup.
Ct. 43, 51 L. ed. 138 (1906).
' Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877) ; cf. Owenby v. Morgan,
256 U. S. 94, 111, 41 Sup. Ct. 433, 438, 65 L. ed. 837, 846 (1921).
'Picquet v. Swan, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,134 (C. C. D. Mass. 1828).
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propositions: (1) the federal courts may issue no process beyond the
territorial limits of their respective districts and may serve only persons
found within those limits, in the absence of positive legislation to the
contrary ;10 (2) Congressional acts" adopting the state practice for the
federal courts did not operate to enlarge the sphere of the federal
courts' jurisdiction, but merely prescribed the forms and modes of
process to be used in acquiring jurisdiction over persons within the
reach of such process; and (3) an attachment against a person's property may issue out of a federal court only as a part of, or together with,
process served upon him personally. Major reliance was placed upon
the Eleventh Section of the Judiciary Act of 178912 (hereinafter referred to as Section 739) which' provided that no civil suit should be
brought in a district or circuit court ". . by any original process in
any other district than that whereof he [the defendant] is an inhabitant
or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ." Four
of the justices dissented from that part of the opinion dealing with attachment upon constructive service on the ground that it was unnecessary for the decision, and, in two instances, expressed the belief that
such procedure was available in federal courts.
After the decision in Toland v. Sprague, two significant statutory
changes occurred. The Act of 187213 (hereinafter referred to as Section 915) provided: "In the common law cases in the circuit and district
courts, the plaintiff shall be entitled to similar remedies, by attachment
or other process, against the property of the defendant, which are now
provided by the laws of the state in which such court is held for the
courts thereof; and such circuit and district courts may, from time to
time, by general rules adopt such state laws as may be in force in the
states where they are held in relation to attachment and other process. . . ." And the Act of 1887,14 amending the venue restrictions of
Section 739, provided that in diversity-of-citizenship cases suit might
be brought in the district of either the plaintiff's or the defendant's
residence. Without straining the meaning of these enactments, it could
be said that they destroy the basis for the decision in Toland v.
Sprague.5 Yet when that contention was advanced, the Supreme
10 By virtue of Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a federal
district court, sitting in a state containing more than one district, may issue its
process throughout the entire state.
111 STAT. §93 (1789) and 1 STAT. §275 (1792), 28 U. S. C. §724 (1934).
"REv. STAT. §739 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §112 (1934).
"REv. STAT. §915 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §726 (1934).
1424 STAT. §552 (1887)
as amended 25 STAT. 433 (1888), 28 U. S. C. §112
(1934).
1 Two lower federal courts asserted that Section 915 enlarged their jurisdiction
to permit the acquiring of original jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant by
means of attachment-and publication of summons. Guillow i,. Fontain, 11 Fed.

Cas. No. 5,861 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1875) ; Brooks v. Fry, 45 Fed. 776 (C. C. W. D.
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Court, in the Big Vein Coal Co.16 case reiterated the doctrine that attachment in the federal courts is not a device for acquiring jurisdiction,
but is available solely as an auxiliary remedy when there has been personal service. Section 915 was summarily dealt with by remarking
that it had been before the Court in Ex parte Des Moines & M. Ry.' 7
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the Act of 1887 did not abrogate
the necessity for personal service, for had Congress intended such a
radical change it would have expressly so provided.' 8
The Court's position in these cases was somewhat compromised, at
least from the standpoint of consistent policy, by its decision of a related question in cases removed from state courts. Although a federal
court could not proceed originally against a nonresident by attachment
and constructive service, if a state court had acquired jurisdiction by
that procedure, a federal court succeeded to that jurisdiction upon removal.' 9 And that was true where the state court had attached the
nonresident's property, but had not, prior to removal, completed the
formalities of service by which its jurisdiction would be perfected. In the
latter event, the federal court acquired an inchoate jurisdiction which
ripened into full jurisdiction over the attached property when the formalities of service were completed.20 Again, however, the Court found
21
statutory authority for its position.
Ark. 1891). However, numerous other lower federal court decisions had construed Section 915 to pertain only to forms and modes of practice to be observed
when the federal court could obtain in personam jurisdiction: Nazro v. Cragin, 17
Fed. Cas. No. 10,062 (C. C. D. Iowa 1874); Harland v. United Lines Tel. Co.,
40 Fed. 308 (C. C. D. Conn. 1889); Lackett v. Rumbaugh, 45 Fed. 23 (C. C.
W. D. N. C. 1891); Central Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Chattanooga R. & C. R. R.,
68 Fed. 685 (C. C. E. D. Tenn. 1895); United States v. Brooke, 184 Fed. 341
(S. D. N. Y. 1910); Smith v. Reed, 210 Fed. 968 (N. D. Ohio 1912).
"8Big Vein Coal Co. v. Read, 229 U. S. 31, 33 Sup. Ct. 694, 57 L. ed. 1053
(1913).
.7103 U. S. 794, 26 L. ed. 461 (1880) (the Court omitted any mention of
Section 915).
" Lower federal courts had previously held that the Act of 1887 introduced
no new principle obviating the necessity for personal service. Harland v. United
Lines Tel. Co., 40 Fed. 308 (C. C. D. Conn. 1889) ; United States v. Brooke, 184
Fed. 341 (S. D. N. Y. 1910); Smith v. Reed, 210 Fed. 968 (N. D. Ohio 1912).
18 Courtney v. Pradt, 196 U. S. 89, 25 Sup. Ct. 208, 49 L. ed. 398 (1905);
Crocker Nat. Bank v. Ragenstecher, 44 Fed. 705 (C. C. D. Mass. 1890); Richmond v. Brookings, 48 Fed. 241 (C. C. D. R. I. 1891); Vermilya v. Brown, 65
Fed. 149 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1894); Blumberg v. A. B. & E. L. Shaw Co., 131
Fed. 608 (C. C. N. Y. 1904).
"0Clark v. Wells, 203 U. S. 164, 27 Sup. Ct. 43, 51 L. ed. 138 (1906) (suggesting that no publication of service was necessary in federal court since defendant
had sufficient notice as evidenced by his special appearance to secure removal);
Lebensburger v. Scofield, 139 Fed. 380 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905) (publication of summons ordered by district court) ; Friedman Bros. & Sons Neckwear Co., Inc. v.
Greaney, 297 Fed. 478 (S. D. N. Y. 1923).
1 REv. STAT. §646 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §79 (1934) provides: "When any suit
shall be removed from a state court to a district count of the United States, any
attachment or sequestration of the goods or estate of the defendant had in such
suit in the state court shall hold -the goods or estate so attached or sequestered
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In the recent case of Rorick v. Devon Syndicate, Ltd.,2 2 suit was
brought in a state court against the nonresident defendant on a personal cause of action. An attachment was levied upon property of the
defendant, and service by publication completed. The defendant secured
a removal to the federal district court on a special appearance. A supplemental attachment issued from the district court and was levied upon
additional property of the defendant. On defendant's motion, this latter
attachment was dissolved on the ground that no personal service had
been made upon the defendant. This ruling was affirmed in the circuit
court of appeals. 2 3 Speaking for the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Douglas proceeded to assail vigorously the holding in Toland v. Sprague and
the cases subsequently affirming it. Three arguments buttress his attack:
First, if Section 73924 justified the Court's conclusion that a defendant
must be personally served to permit the levy of an attachment, that
justification was removed by the statutory revisal authorizing suit in
the district of either the plaintiff's or defendant's residence. Second,
the philosophy underlying the decision in Toland v. Sprague and the
Big Vein Coal Co. case, 7iz., that it is unjust to adjudicate a person's
rights without affording him notice by personal service, 25 was repudiated
by Section 64626 and by the decision in the removal cases. Third, Congress has, in Section 915,27 expressly granted to plaintiffs in the federal
courts the same remedies by attachment or other process that are available in the state courts.
The actual decision in the principal case is confined to the proposition that, where attachment has supplied quasi-in-ren- jurisdiction to a
state court prior to removal, the federal court is permitted to issue a
supplemental attachment, provided such a remedy is available under the
state procedure. Hence, the hostile and extended consideration of the
doctrine of Toland v. Sprague appears to be gratuitous dictum, for the
to answer the final judgment or decree in the same manner as by law they 'would
have been held to answer final judgment or decree had it been rendered by the
court in which said suit was commenced. .. "
22 306 U. S. 626, 59 Sup. Ct. 643, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 620 (1939).
.'Rorick v. Devon Syndicate, 100 F. (2d) 844 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939). Additional
factors, irrelevant to the present discussion, which were relied on in the disposition
of the case, were: (1) the district court held the original affidavit in attachment
void because taken before a notary disqualified as an "interested" party; (2) the
circuit court held the attachment issued by the state court to be premature and
void because executed before commencement of service by publication, in violation
of a state statute. Both these holdings were subsequently reversed by the Supreme
Court as being based on an erroneous construction of the state statutes.
2,REV. STAT. §739 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §112 (1934).
22 See Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, 329, 9 L. ed. 1093, 1105 (U. S. 1836);
Picquet v. Swan, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,134 at 613 (C. C. D. Mass. 1828) ; Nazro v.
Cragin,
17 Fed. Cas. No. 10,062 at 1260 (C. C. D. Iowa 1874).
2 REV. STAT. §646 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §79 (1934) ; see note 22, supra.
2 REV. STAT. §915 (1872), 28 U. S. C. §726 (1934).
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question actually raised and the reasoning of the lower courts could have
been disposed of by reference to the removal cases discussed above.
Speculation arises as to the motives of the Court in discussingand then adversely-the doctrine of Toland v. Sprague. Was it merely
an attempt to educate the lower courts on the distinction between the
use of attachment in cases of removal and in cases of original jurisdiction? Such a purpose would hardly necessitate criticism of the doctrine. Or was the Court intimating that on a future occasion it may not
refuse to allow a federal district court to acquire original jurisdiction
by way of attachment and constructive service? Such an intimation
would not be surprising from a Court which has recently displayed its
willingness to re-examine any questionable precedents. 28 The disparity
between the scope of attachment in the state courts and in the federal
courts may be an unfortunate retention. 29 In the light of the recent
revision of federal procedure allowing federal process to run throughout
the state in which the court sits,30 a change permitting federal courts
to acquire original jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant by means
of attachment and constructive service might be a desirable adjunct to
the usefulness of the federal courts.
JAmES

K. DORSETT,

JR.

Libel and Slander-Publication-PrivilegeDictation to a Stenographer.
Plaintiff, having been discharged from the employ of defendant
company for alleged misconduct, went to defendant's manager and requested a separation notice which was required to be filed with the
Unemployment Compensation Commission. The manager made a notation on a blank notice that the cause of separation should be "Misconduct", and, at his request, plaintiff took the notice to defendant's
stenographer who filled it out and inserted as the cause of separation
the word "Misconduct". In an action for libel, the Court sustained the
defendant's demurrer, holding that there was no publication to support
the action, as communication to a stenographer was insufficient. 1
Much authority supports the decision reached here. On the theory
that a corporation can act only through its agents, 2 it is held that com"5Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188 (1938) ;
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S.466, 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 83 L. ed.
Adv. Ops. 577 (1939).
" Early criticism was found in Dormitzer v. Illinois & St. Louis Bridge Co.,
6 Fed. 217, 218 (C. C. D. Mass. 1881).
" Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(f).
Satterfield v. McLellan Stores, 215 N. C. 582, 2 S. E. (2d) 709 (1939).
2 Cartwright-Caps Co. v. Fischel and Kaufman, 113 Miss. 359, 74 So. 278

(1917).
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munications between agents of a corporation concerning corporate business are not thereby published. 3 A leading case,4 cited and followed by
the North Carolina Supreme Court, holds that the acts of a manager
and stenographer of a corporation constitute a single corporate act.
Those involved are not regarded as third parties for the purpose of
publication, but as common servants with a duty to carry out the single
act of the corporation.5 As to the stenographer of an individual, the
same result would probably bd reached, the stenographer being considered only the confidential instrumentality of the employer. 6 Under
modern business conditions, a stenographer is necessary to the transaction. 7 The taking and transcribing of the dictation is mainly a
mechanical process,8 so the stenographer is not considered to possess
such an independent third party personality as would warrant a holding
of publication.9 "It is inconceivable how the business of the country,
under the present conditions, can be carried on, if a business man or
corporation must be subject to litigation for every letter containing some
statement too strong, where it is only sent to the person to whom
directed, and only heard by a stenographer to whom the letter is
dictated."' 10
A number of cases adopt the view that dictation to a stenographer
is by itself sufficient to constitute publication.'
Under this view, a
' Briggs v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 66 F. (2d) 87 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) ;George
v. Georgia Power Co., 43 Ga. App. 596, 159 S. E. 756 (1931) ; Prins v. HollandNorth American Mortgage Co., 107 Wash. 206, 181 Pac. 680 (1919).
' Owen v. Ogilvie Publishing Co., 32 App. Div. 465, 53 N. Y. Supp. 1033 (2d
Dep't. 1898).
Central of Georgia Ry. v. Jones, 18 Ga. App. 414, 89 S. E. 429 (1916)
Cartwright-Caps Co. v. Fischel and Kaufman, 113 Miss. 359, 74 So. 278 (1917)
'Wells v. Belstrat Hotel Corp., 212 App. Div. 366, 208 N. Y. Supp. 625 (1st Dep't.
1925) ;Freeman v. Dayton Scale Co., 159 Tenn. 413, 19 S.W. (2d) 255 (1929) ;
Chalkley v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 150 Va. 301. 143 S.E. 631 (1928). Accord:
Briggs v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 66 F. (2d) 87 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) ; Prins v.
Holland-North American Mortgage Co., 107 Wash. 206, 181 Pac. 680 (1919)
cf. George v. Georgia Power Co., 43 Ga. App. 596, 159 S.E. 756 (1931).
"See Freeman v. Dayton Scale Co., 159 Tenn. 413, 19 S.W. (2d) 255 (1929);
cf. Morgan v. Wallis, 33 T. L. R. 495 (K. B. 1917).
"Wells v. Belstrat Hotel Corp., 212 App. Div. 366, 208 N. Y. Supp. 625 (1st
Dep't. 1925).
' Freeman v. Dayton Scale Co., 159 Tenn. 413, 19 S. W. (2d) 255 (1929)
cf. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cashman. 149 Fed. 367 (C. C. A. 5th, 1906).
Freeman v. Dayton Scale Co., 159 Tenn. 413, 19 S.W. (2d) 255 (1929).
"0Cartwright-Caps Co. v. Fischel and Kaufman, 113 Miss. 359, 363, 74 So.
278. 279 (1917).
" Nelson v. Whitten, 272 Fed. 135 (E. D. N. Y. 1921) ; Ferndon v. Dickens,
161 Ala. 181, 49 So. 888 (1909) : Berry v. City of New York Ins. Co., 210 Ala.
369, 98 So. 290 (1923); Gambrill v. Schooley, 93 Md. 48, 48 Ati. 730 (1901);
Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N. Y. 36, 175 N. E. 505 (1931) ; Bradley v. Conners, 169
Misc. 442, 7 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 294 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Pullman v. Hill, (1891) 1
Q. B. 524; see Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Bailey. 101 Va. 443, 445, 44 S. E. 692,
693 (1903) ; cf. Bacon v. Michigan Central Ry., 55 Mich. 224 (1884); Kennedy v.
James Butler, Inc., 245 N Y. 204, 156 N. E. 666 (1927). RESTATE.EiE.NT, TORTS
(1938) §557, comment (h).
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stenographer's transcription of the dictated matter is more than a mere
mechanical process; there is produced in the mind as full and clear a
perception of the dictated material as if there had been a slower copying
by one not so skilled in stenographic work.1 2- The stenographer, therefore, whether of a corporation or of an individual, in reading and
transcribing the notes, is the human third party necessary to publication. 13 It is further argued that statements so communicated to a
stenographer are no less injurious, 14 as they will certainly influence the
stenographer in his estimation of the person defamed, who is as much
entitled to the respect and esteem of the stenographer as of anyone
else. 15 Where the communication is sent to the person defamed, "the
outrage is without redress if the libel is not published wyhen written out
and read" by the stenographer.10
It seems to be the more logical and better rule to hold every dictation
to a stenographer a publication, because actually the stenographer is a
separate and distinct human being, as required by the law of defamation.
Even under this holding, the defendant is not deprived of other defenses, unless he dictated the communication maliciously.
The principal case might have been decided without considering the
question of defendant's publication to the stenographer. The plaintiff
went to the defendant's manager and requested the separation notice,
and the reason for her discharge was stated on the blank that she took
to the stenographer. As a consequence, the plaintiff might have been
denied recovery as she only got what she asked for, 17 because she herself, and not the defendant's manager, published it.' 8
Where there is a publication, the defendant may still escape liability
if his communication is privileged. "The question of privilege must be
kept distinct from the question of publication. Privilege, of course, in
In order for a deno sense negatives publication; it justifies it."'u
fendant to rely on this defense, there must have been a privileged
12

Gambrill v. Schooley, 93 Md. 48, 48 Ati. 730 (1901).

" Bradley v. Conners, 169 Misc. 442, 7 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 294 (Sup. Ct. 1938);

Adams v. Lawson, 17 Gratt. 250 (Va. 1867).
14 Nelson v. Whitten, 272 Fed. 135 (E. D. N. Y. 1921).
1
Berry v. City of New York Ins. Co., 210 Ala. 369, 98 So. 290 (1923).
0Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N. Y. 36, 40, 175 N. E. 505, 506 (1931).
1 Melcher v. Beeler, 48 Colo. 233, 110 Pac. 181 (1910) ; Hoff v. Pure Oil Co.,
147 Minn. 195, 179 N: W. 891 (1920) ; Miller v. Donovan, 16 Misc. 453, 39 N. Y.
Supp. 820 (Sup. Ct. 1896); Schoepflin v. Coffey, 162 N. Y. 12, 56 N. E. 502
(1900); Taylor v. McDaniels, 139 Okla. 262, 281 Pac. 967 (1029). Accord:
Burdett v. Hines, 125 Miss. 66, 87 So. 470 (1921) ; cf. Beeler v. Jackson, 64 Md.
589, 2 Atl. 916 (1885). But cf. Nelson v. Whitten, 272 Fed. 135 (E. D. N. Y.
1921).
" Shepard v. Lamphier, 84 Misc. 498, 146 N. Y. Supp. 745 (Sup. Ct. 1914);
Fonville v. McNease, Dud. Eq. 303 (S. C. 1838) ; Sylvis v. Miller, 96 Tenn. 96,
Atl. 244 (1892).
33 S.W. 921 (1896): Wilcox v. Moon, 64 Vt. 450, 24658.
19 18 HALSBURY, THE LAws OF ENGLAND (1911)
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occasion for the publication, and the defendant must have remained
20
within the scope of the privilege.
A communication is privileged, although it contains matter otherwise defamatory, and therefore actionable, if it is honestly made in good
faith on a subject concerning which the sender and receiver both have
an interest or duty.21 Communications between parties engaged in a
common business transaction or dispute, 22 or between an employer and
employee or a principal and agent,2 3 relating to the subject matter of
the business involved, fall within the limits of a privileged communication. Both parties to the communication have an interest and duty
therein, since it concerns the business in which both are engaged. To
insure the establishment of a privilege, a communication must be confined to the subject matter or purpose of the business involved, and not
24
go beyond it by dwelling on irrelevant matter.
There is also a privilege when a person gives information, either
voluntarily or by request, concerning the character of a former employee
who seeks to obtain employment from another. 25 Such privilege is
based on a moral or social duty to give the information, 26 and the communication need not be confined to facts which the sender knows of his
27
own knowledge, or to information which he has fully investigated.
'0Bohlinger v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 100 Ark. 477, 140 S. W. 257 (1911);
Stewart
v. Riley, 114 W. Va. 578, 172 S. E. 791 (1934).
2" Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Watson, 55 F. (2d) 184 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Mutual Benefit Ass'n., 82 F. (2d) 115 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936)
Bohlinger v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 100 Ark. 477, 140 S. W. 257 (1911); Missouri Pacific Transportation Co. v. Beard, 179 Miss. 764, 176 So. 156 (1937);
Harrison v. Garrett, 132 N. C. 172, 43 S. E. 594 (1903); Brown v. Elm City
Lumber Co., 167 N. C. 9, 82 S. E. 961 (1914) ; Alexander v. Vann, 180 N. C. 187,
104 S. E. 360 (1920); Elmore v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 189 N. C. 658, 127
S. E. 110 (1925).
22 Brown v. Elm City Lumber Co., 167 N. C. 9, 82 S. E. 961 (1914) ; Roff v.
British and French Chemical Mfg. Co. (1918) 2 K. B. 677; Osborn v. Thomas
Boulter & Son, L. R. (1930) 2 K. B. 226. Accord: Edmondson v. Birch & Co.
(1907) 1 K. B. 371.
2" Bohlinger v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 100 Ark. 477, 140 S. W. 257 (1911);
Nichols v. Eaton, 110 Iowa 509, 81 N. W. 792 (1900); Missouri Pacific Transportation Co. v. Beard, 179 Miss. 764, 176 So. 156 (1937). Accord: Hebner v.
Great Northern Ry., 78 Minn. 289, 80 N. W. 1128 (1899); Lawless v. AngloEgyptian Cotton and Oil Co., L. R. (1869) 4 Q. B. 262; cf. Louisiana Oil Corp.
v. Renno,
173 Miss. 609, 157 So. 705 (1934).
,
2 Bohlinger v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 100 Ark. 477, 140 S. W. 257 (1911).
"2Solow v. General Motors Truck Co., 64 F. (2d) 105 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) ;
Radovich v. Douglas, 84 Colo. 149, 268 Pac. 575 (1928) ; Fresh v. Cutter, 73 Md.
87, 20 At. 774 (1890) ; Dale v. Harris, 109 Mass. 193 (1871) ; Doane v. Grew,
220 Mass. 171, 107 N. E. 620 (1915); McKenna v. Mansfield Leland Hotel Co.,
55 Ohio App. 163, 9 N. E. (2d) 166 (1936). Accord: Missouri Pacific Ry. v.
Behee, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 107, 21 S. W. 384 (1893). NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL
(4th ed. 1924) §404.
2 Radovich v. Douglas. 84 Colo. 149, 268 Pac. 575 (1928); NEWELL, SLANDER
AND LIBEL (4th ed. 1924) §404.
2 Doane v. Grew, 220 Mass. 171, 107 N. E. 620 (1915) ; NEWELL, SLANDER AND
LIBEL (4th ed. 1924) §404.
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That the communication contains untrue or mistaken statements will
not necessarily destroy the privilege. 28 The only material requirement
is that the communication be made in good faith with a belief in its
truth.29 Herein lies the ground upon which the decision of the principal case should have been reached. There was a privilege betveen
the defendant and the Unemployment Compensation Commission that
would protect the communication. The Commission, by its very nature,
had a duty to receive the notice from the plaintiff's former employer
and file it in order that the plaintiff might receive its benefits. When
the notice was requested, to be filed with the Commission as required,
the defendant's manager had a duty to give it, and there is no indication
that he did not do so in good faith, or that he did not believe in its
truth. A privilege once established protects the defendant who uses the
reasonable and customary methods of communication."0 Dictation of
the communication to a stenographer or clerk is within this rule as an
ordinary way for a corporation or business man to handle legitimate
business, so that such dictation does not destroy the privilege. 8 '
Since dictation to a stenographer is not an excessive publication a
plaintiff cannot recover without proof of excess malice.3 2 Mere mistakes or falsity3 4 in the communication is insufficient to constitute
28 McKenna v. Mansfield Leland Hotel Co., 55 Ohio App. 163, 9 N. E. (2d)
166 (1936); Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Behee, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 107, 21 S. W. 384
(1893) ; NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL (4th ed. 1924) §404.
2 Fresh v. Cutter, 73 Md. 87, 20 AdI. 774 (1890) ; Doane v. Grew, 220 Mass.
171, 107 N. E. 620 (1915). Accord: Solow v. General Motors Truck Co., 64 F.
(2d) 105 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933); McKenna v. Mansfield Leland Hotel Co., 55 Ohio
App. 163, 9 N. E. (2d) 166 (1936). NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL (4th ed. 1924)
§404.
"0Globe Furniture Co. v. Wright, 265 Fed. 873 (App. D. C. 1920) ; Lawless
v. Anglo-Egyptian Cotton and Oil Co., L. R. (1869) 4 Q. B. 262; Boxsius v.
Goblet Fr~res, (1894) 1 Q. B. 842; Edmondson v. Birch & Co., (1907) 1 K. B.
371; Roff v. British And French Chemical Mfg. Co., (1918) 2 K. B. 677; Osborn
v. Thomas Boulter and Son, L. R. (1930) 2 K. B. 226.
" Boxsius v. Goblet Fr~res, (1894) 1 Q. B. 842; Edmondson v. Birch & Co.,
(1907) 1 K. B. 371; Osborn v. Thomas Boulter & Son, L. R. (1930) 2 K. B. 226.
Accord: Globe Furniture Co. v. Wright, 265 Fed. 873 (App. D. C. 1920); Roff
v. British and French Chemical Mfg. Co., (1918) 2 K. B. 677; cf. Bohlinger v.
Germania Life Ins. Co., 100 Ark. 477, 140 S. W. 257 (1911). Contra: Gambrill v.
Schooley, 93 Md. 48, 4& Ati. 730 (1901); Pullman v. Hill, (1891) 1 Q. B. 524
(these two cases, holding that the prevalence of business conditions or business
pressure do not warrant resort to stenographic assistance, if rightly decided, were
so decided because the respective courts found that business conditions at the time
did not justify disclosing any letter to another employee).
"2 A court will not imply or impute malice when privilege has been established.
Bohlinger v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 100 Ark. 477, 140 S. W. 257 (1911);
Hebner v. Great Northern Ry., 78 Minn. 289, 80 N. W. 1128 (1899); Missouri
Pacific Transportation Co. v. Beard, 179 Miss. 764, 176 So. 156 (1937); 'Harrison
v. Garrett, 132 N. C. 172, 43 S. E. 594 (1903) ; Brown v. Elm City Lumber Co.,
167 N. C. 9, 82 S. E. 961 (1914); Stewart v. Riley, 114 W. Va. 578, 172 S. E.
791 (1934); Flynn v. Western Union Tel. Co., 199 Wis. 124, 225 N. W. 742
(1929).
:'Brown v. Elm City Lumber Co., 167 N. C. 9, 82 S. E. 961 (1914).
2, Bohlinger v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 100. Ark. 477, 140 S. W. 257 (1911).
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malice. Malice may be shown if the plaintiff can prove that the communication was not made in good faith,35 but that the defendant availed
himself of the privileged occasion wilfully and knowingly for the purpose of defaming the plaintiff,36 or made the communication37in reckless
disregard of the justifiability of the defamatory statements.
It seems rather unfortunate that the North Carolina court, in deciding its first case on this point, should base its opinion on the artificial
holding that there is no publication to the .stenographer because she is
not a third person in her duties as an employee of a corporation, when
the same result could have been more logically reached on the grounds
of a privileged publication. If this latter method had been used, subsequent plaintiffs would be more adequately protected against similar
communications maliciously dictated.
J. B. CHEsHiRE, IV.
Mortgages-Deeds of Trust-Power of Sale-Rights of Mo'rtgagor
Not in Default After Wrongful Sale.
P procured a loan from D land bank, securing the bank by a deed
of trust on her farm. P then made an agreement with W, joined as a
defendant, whereby he became her tenant and agreed to apply a certain
rental each year toward discharging the principal of the obligation and
the interest thereon. P alleges that W failed to apply the rents and
profits properly, and that instead he entered a separate agreement with
the bank whereby he became its tenant; and that after several years,
during which W and D failed properly to apply rental value, and committed waste by selling timber, D declared P in default, and procured
a sale by the trustee. The bank, D, was the purchaser, and later conveyed to H, also joined as a defendant, from whom W subsequently
acquired through purchase. P claims that she was improperly deprived
of her land through the fraud of the defendants, and of others whose
mention is not necessary; she asks for an accounting as to rents, and
profits, for the sale of the land to be set aside as void, for recovery of
the amount of waste and of timber cut, and for a chance to redeem her
land.
P was nonsuited in the lower court, and the Supreme Court sustained this as to all defendants save D. The court was of the opinion that
the evidence in the light most favorable to P showed that D had become
" Missouri Pacific Transportation Co. v. Beard, 179 Miss. 764, 176 So. 156
(1937) ; Brown v. Elm City Lumber Co., 167 N. C. 9, 82 S. E. 961 (1914) ; Elmore v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 189 N. C. 658, 127 S. E. 110 (1925).
11 Missouri Pacific Transportation Co. v. Beard, 179 Miss. 764, 176 So. 156
(1937) ; Elmore v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 189 N. C. 658, 127 S. E. 110 (1925).
" Missouri Pacific Transportation Co. v. Beard, 179 Miss. 764, 176 So. 156
(1937).
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mortgagee in possession, and that P was consequently entitled to an
accounting for rents and profits during the period of such relationship.
The court said, further, that if, as P claims, nothing was due D at the
time of the sale, and the latter brought about the sale wrongfully, P
would ordinarily be entitled to redeem the land, unless this has been
rendered impossible by D's conduct, in which eventuality the remedy of
damages is available.' The case raises the question as to what rights a
mortgagor not actually in default has when his land is conveyed to an
innocent purchaser under the power in the instrument, and leaves a
good deal of doubt as to what "conduct" by the mortgagee would render
redemption impossible.
Even in lien states, where the mortgagor and not the mortgagee is
entitled to possession, the latter may obtain the rights of a "mortgagee
in possession". Some states allow him these rights only if he enter with
the express or implied consent of the mortgagor ;2 others extend the
doctrine to peaceable entry in good faith under color of law ;8 a third
group requires only that the possession be peaceably acquired. 4 One
who has become a "mortgagee in possession" may not be divested of this
status until the obligation is satisfied.5 Once the character of mortgagee in possession has been assumed, whether the jurisdiction be title
or lien, he enters into some well settled rights and obligations. He is
chargeable with the rents and profits from such landB which he must
apply as payment on the debt and interest thereon accruing;7 with
waste;8 and with acts amounting to flagrant mismanagement.
He
must keep the premises in such repair as will conserve the property and
prevent ruin and decay, and he must account for losses resulting from
1 Fleming v. North Carolina Joint Stock and Land Bank, 215 N. C. 414, 2 S. E.
(2d) 3 (1939).
'Jones v. Rigby, 41 Minn. 530, 43 N. W. 390 (1899); Herrmann v. Land
Cabinet Co., 217 N. Y. 526, 112 N. E. 476 (1916).
3 Cameron v. Ah Quong, 175 Cal. 377, 165 Pac. 961 (1917); Pettit v. Louis,
88 Neb. 496, 129 N. W. 1005 (1911).
'Stouffer v. Harlan, 68 Kan. 135, 74 Pac. 610 (1903) ; Jagar v. Plunkett, 81
Kan. 565, 106 Pac. 280 (1910) ; (1928) 7 TEXc L. REv. 170.
5Cory
v. Santa Ynes Land Co., 151 Cal. 778, 91 Pac. 647 (1907). An exception to the rule occurs when there is gross mismanagement by the mortgagee
in possession. Harding v. Garber, 20 Okla. 11, 93 Pac. 539 (1907) ; 3 JoNEs,
MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) §1931; note (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 1248. 1253, n. 31.
6Union Bank of Columbia v. Cook, 110 S. C. 99, 96 S. E. 484 (1918) (in
absence of evidence, the rent may be assumed to equal the interest) ; 2 JoNES,
MORTGAGES

§1425.

Peugh v. Davis, 113 U. S. 542, 5 Sup. Ct. 622, 28 L. ed. 1127 (1885) ; Green
v. Rodman, 150 N. C. 176, 63 S. E. 732 (1909); 2 JoNEs, MORTGAGES §1437;
WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) §§19, 20.
'American Freehold Land Mortgage Co. v. Pollard, 132 Ala. 155, 32 So. 630
(1902) (timber removed); Smith v. Stringer, 228 Ala. 630, 155 So. 85 (1934)
(grapevines destroyed).
9 Baumgard v. Bowman, 31 Ohio App. 266, 167 N. E. 166 (1928) ; see note 5,
supra.
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his failure to discharge such duty. 10 He is credited with reasonably
necessary repairs," but not with what are dearly improvements, unless
these were made under the mistaken belief that he was actually the
owner in fee.' 2 He can usually demand credit for tax payments, 13 for
the paying off of prior liens, 1 4 and for any insurance outlay, 15 unless
this is made solely for his own purposes.le
The right of the mortgagor in the instant case to an accounting from
the mortgagee is therefore clear, since the mortgagee was in possession
because the mortgagor's tenant had become its tenant. If on such an
accounting it turns out that there was nothing due the mortgagee at the
time of the foreclosure, the problem is raised as to the rights of P as
against the bank, D, purchaser at the sale, and W, who eventually acquired the title. This is a phase of the larger question: "What rights and
remedies does a mortgagor have after a foreclosure sale, or sale under
power, which is in some way defective?"
In general, sales under power in a mortgage or deed of trust may be
set aside at the instance of the mortgagor where he suffers injury by
reason of fraud or deceit on the part of the mortgagee or trustee making the sale ;17 where the price received has been so grossly inadequate
as to shock the conscience, if there is also any evidence of collusion,
oppression, or even gross mismanagement by the mortgagee or the trustee :18 or where the mortgagee or trustee becomes purchaser at his own
sale, unless specifically authorized to do so either by the terms of the
10 Dozier v. Mitchell, 65 Ala. 511 (1880); 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
(3d ed. 1905) §1217; WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) §21; cf. Brown v. South Boston
Savings Bank, 148 Mass. 300, 19 N. E. 382 (1889).
" Lynch v. Ryan, 137 Wis. 13, 118 N. W. 174 (1908); 3 POMEROY, EQUITY
§1217; WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) §21.
Mickle v. Dillaye, 17 N. Y. 80 (1858); Turk v. Page, 64 Okla. 251, 167
Pac. 462 (1917) ; WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) §21.
13 Hays v. Christiansen, 114 Neb. 764, 209 N. W. 609 (1926).
14 Harper v. Ely, 70 Ill. 581 (1873) ; Madison Baptist Church v. Oliver Street
Baptist Church, 73 N. Y. 82 (1878).
5 Hays v. Christiansen, 114 Neb. 764, 209 N. W. 609 (1926) ; 2 JONES, MORTGAGES §1452.
18 Wise v. Layman, 197 Ind. 393, 150 N. E. 368 (1926).
11
The mortgagor can usually proceed against the mortgagee for damages at
law, or have the deed canceled; but if the land goes to an innocent purchaser, the
only recourse is a suit for damages against the offending mortgagee. Warren v.
Susman, 168 N. C. 457, 84 S. E. 760 (1915); Pritchard v. Smith, 160 N. C. 79,
75 S. E. 803 (1912) ; cf. Carr v. Graham, 128 Ga. 622, 57 S. E. 875 (1907) ; Rich
v. Brooks, 179 N. C. 204, 102 S.E. 207 (1920).
18 Sargent v.
Shumaker, 193 Cal. 122, 223 Pac. 464 (1924) ; cf. Holton Park
Co. v. Gary, 133 Md. 509, 105 At. 751 (1919). Mere inadequacy of price, standing alone, cannot upset a duly advertised sale. Gadreault v. Sherman, 250 Mass. 145,
145 N. E. 49 (1924) ; Roberson v. Matthews, 200 N. C. 241, 156 S. E. 496 (1931) ;
Elkes v. Interstate Trustee Corp., 209 N. C. 832, 184 S. E. 826 (1936); note
(1933) 11 N. C. L. REv. 172. Also see in this connection N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1935) §2593(b) (statutory provision for enjoining sales at which the price offered
is inadequate).
JURISPRUDENCE
1
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instrument or by statute.1 9 It is widely held that a sale' which fails to
comply with requirements as to notice and advertisement which are
specified in the instrument, or by statute, is void and ineffective to pass
legal title.20 A sale will not usually be set aside on the ground of mere
informality or irregularity not affecting the right to sell or the substantial rights of the parties involved. 21
The instant case raises the question of the effect of a sale when
there has been no default. Here the decisions are somewhat conflicting.
It has been indicated in a few cases that if the mortgage has been paid
before the sale, such sale is voidable, and a purchaser obtains at most a
bare legal title which he holds in trust for the benefit for the mortgagor, or owner of the mortgaged estate,2 2 but this view does not seem
to be very generally followed. A number of states, in which payment
of the debt automatically extinguishes the mortgage securing it and the
power of sale contained therein, have adopted the rule that any sale
made under the power after the debt is paid is void, even as against a
bona fide purchaser. 23 The reason for this rule, as stated in Rogers v.
Barnes,24 a leading case, is that since default of the mortgagor is a condition precedent to the right of sale, this right does not accrue and cannot be exercised until default occurs. According to this case, the
mortgagor may elect whether to recover full damages on account of
the unlawful sale of the land, thus ratifying the title of the innocent
purchaser; or to repudiate the sale and redeem the premises.2
It has

"9There is a presumption of fraud at such sale, although there may be none.
Gibson v. Barbour, 100 N. C. 192, 6 S. E. 766 (1887). The mortgagor can usually
affirm the sale and thus ratify it; or he may avoid it and set it aside. Joyner v.
Farmer, 78 N. C. 196 (1878). But an innocent purchaser for value gets a good
title even from a mortgagee who thus buys. Very v. Russell, 65 N. H. 646, 23
Atl. 522 (1874) ; see Froneberger v. Lewis, 79 N. C. 426, 431 (1878) ; cf. Smith
v. Greensboro Bank, 213 N. C. 343, 196 S. E. 481 (1938).
2' Cox v. American Freehold & Land Mortgage Co., 88 Miss. 88, 40 So. 739
(1906). Contra: Fountain v. Pateman, 189 Ala. 153, 66 So. 75 (1914); see
Everett v. Woodward, 162 Va. 419, 422, 174 S. E. 864, 867 (1934). A subsequent
purchaser is protected from defects in the proceedings which do not appear of
record, and of which he had no notice, actual or constructive. Fountain v. Pateman, 189 Ala. 153, 66 So. 75 (1914); Phipps v. Wyatt, 199 N. C. 727, 155 S. E.
721 (1930) ; see Laramore v. Jones, 157 Ga. 366, 372, 121 S. E. 411, 414 (1924).
WALSH, MORTGAGES

(1934) §85.

Farmers Bank v. Murphree, 200 Ala. 574, 76 So. 932 (1917) ; Flynn v. Curtis
& Pope Lumber Co., 245 Mass. 291, 139 N. E. 533 (1923) ; Jessup v. Nixon, 186
N. C. 100, 118 S. E. 908 (1923) ; Brown v. Sheets, 197 N. C. 268, 148 S. E. 233
(1929)..
(1 See Askew v. Sanders, 84 Ala. 356, '358, 4 So. 167, 168 (1888); Chapin v.
21

Billings, 91 Ill. 539, 544 (1879) ; Fleming v. Barden, 126 N. C. 450, 456, 36 S. E.
17, 19 (1900) ; note (1903) 92 Am. St. Rep. 597.
22 Redmond v. Packenham, 66 Ill. 434 (1872); Crowley v. Adams; 226 Mass.
582, 116 N. E. 241 (1917); Huntington v. Crafton, 76 Tex. 497, 13 S. W. 542
(1890) ; see Wells v. Estes, 154 Mo. 291, 299, 55 S. W; 255, 257 (1900) ; Ferguson
v. Coward, 59 Tenn. 572, 573 (1872).
24 169 Mass. 179, 47 N. E. 602 (1897).
2 The Massachusetts court said further, however, that a parol ratification of
the sale and the deed thereunder would make the purchaser's title secure, and that
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also been indicated that if the innocent purchaser is in possession after
the sale, a court of equity may set the sale aside and compel a reconveyance of the legal title, so as to remove the cloud on the mortgagor's
20
title.
As opposed to this, however, there is the more general rule governing defective sales, which is followed in North Carolina, that a
purchaser without actual or constructive notice of irregularity in the
proceedings, gets a valid title, although the mortgagor might redeem as
against the person making the sale. 27 A subsequent or remote grantee
is not bound to look beyond the recitals of the trustee's deed, and, when
he acts in good faith, he takes a good title as against any defects in the
sale of which he had no actual or constructive knowledge. 28 In accordance with this, it has been held a number of times that where a mortgage containing a power of sale has in fact been discharged, but the
mortgagor has failed to have such release made of record, an innocent
purchaser at a sale made-thereafter will be protected, the mortgagee
being held responsible to the mortgagor for whatever damage he suffers
through this wrongful sale.2 9 In North Carolina, in the leading case of
Burnett v. Dunn Commission and Supply Co.,30 the court held invalid
an attempted exercise of a power of sale after the debt had been satisfied. According to this case, the mortgagor has an election of remedies: he can ratify the sale and accept the proceeds thereof in settlement; he can, by repudiating the sale, sue the trustee or mortgagee for
the wrong done in making such sale and hold him liable for the worth
of the property ;31 or he can mantain an action to set aside the sale,
"assuredly so as against the defendant [mortgagee], and one purchasing with notice".8 2 The implication is that if the land has gone to an
innocent third person, the mortgagor might, perforce, be remitted to his
laches or acts amounting to an estoppel might prevent the mortgagor from contesting the validity of such a title.
" Redmond v. Packenham, 66 Ill. 434 (1872).
17 Shillaber v. Robinson, 97 U. S. 68, 24 L. ed. 967 (1878) ; Hinton v. Hall, 166
N. C. 477, 82 S. E. 847 (1914) ; 3 JoNEs, MORTGAGES §2441; WALSH, MORTGAGES
(1934)
§85.
8
"H
inton v. Hall, 166 N. C. 477, 82 S. E. 847 (1914); Brewington v. Hargrove, 179 N. C. 279, 100 S. E. 308 (1919).
"' Garrett v. Crawford, 128 Ga. 519, 57 S. E. 792 (1907); Merchant v. Woods,
27 Minn. 396, 7 N. W. 826 (1881) ; Bausman v. Eads, 46 Minn. 148, 48 N. W. 769
(1891) ; 2 JONES, MORTGAGES §2453 (the measure of damages allowed is usually
the full worth of the property at the time of the sale since that is the amount the
mortgagor has lost through the mortgagee's tort).
O180 N. C. 117, 104 S. E. 137 (1920).
(an allowai Cf. Stansberry v. McDowell, 194 Mo. 194, 186 S. W. 757 (1916)
ance of punitive damages when the mortgagee's tortious foreclosure is intentionally
oppressive and wanton).
"Burnett v. Dunn Commission and Supply Co., 180 N. C. 117, 118, 104 S. E.
137, 138 (1920).
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remedy of damages, as in the cases involving other irregularities in the
sale.
In the principal case (assuming the accounting will show that nothing was owing at the time of foreclosure) the right to exercise the
power of sale had not yet accrued, and hence the sale was unauthorized.
Since D bank, the creditor secured by the deed of trust, purchased at
the sale and could not be considered a purchaser without notice of the
defect, the sale could be avoided as to D. But the bank sold to H, who
sold to W. If H is a purchaser for value without notice, then under
the general rule followed in North Carolina that a subsequent grantee
is not charged with defects in the foreclosure sale of which he had no
notice, P could not avoid the sale and recover the land if IT still held
3 3
it.
Although, in such a situation, as that in the principal case, W
would certainly be no grantee without notice, still if the land goes from
the bona fide purchaser to a subsequent vendee with notice, the latter's
title is unassailable, provided he did not participate in the wrong.3 4 Here
it would by no means be clear that W did not so participate. Therefore, even admitting that a bona fide purchaser would take title under
the defective sale, whether any cause of action existed as against W
would seem to depend on whether H was indeed a bona fide purchaser,
and whether W was a participator in the bank's wrong.
In support of the rule that a purchaser without notice should keep
the land as against the mortgagor, it may be argued that there is little
danger that an innocent mortgagor will suffer any great injustice if he
takes any reasonable precautions in safeguarding his interests. If the
debt has in- fact been paid, the mortgagor may protect himself against
any sale to an innocent purchaser by having this discharge made of
record with the register of deeds in compliance with our North Carolina
recordation statute.3 5 There is small likelihood of any sale being held
without the mortgagor's knowledge in view of the customary notice and
advertisement before sale.36 He has the right to file in the register of
deeds office a lis pendens, which is notice to all subsequent purchasers
of land in such county that they buy subject to the outcome of a suit
which the mortgagor is to bring.3 7 Simpler still, the mortgagor could
appear at the sale and give unmistakable notice that he protests; this
certainly would give any immediate purchaser notice. Since silence or
failure to give any protest at the sale,38 or subsequent ratification and
"3Brown v. Sheets, 197 N. C. 268, 148 S.E. 233 (1929) ; Lockridge v. Smith.
206 N. C. 174, 173 S.E. 36 (1934); Davis v. Doggett, 212 N. C. 589, 194 S.E
288 (1937).
' Brown v.Sheets, 197 N. C. 268, 148 S. E. 233, 63 A. L. R. 1362 (1929).
' N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §2594.
6 Id. §687.
'7Id. §§500-502.
3
" Lewis v. Nunn, 180 N. C. 159, 104 S.E. 470 (1920).
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rental from the purchaser,39 or unreasonable delay such as to constitute
laches, 40 may preclude the mortgagor from getting his equitable relief,
he would do well to assiduously avoid any conduct or inactivity which
might work an estoppel on him in his attempt to have the sale set aside.
This would seem true in some measure of this case. The mortgagor,
so far as appears, made no attempt to warn prospective buyers, and
waited five years after the sale to bring this bill to account and redeem.
On the other band, instances of hardship are quite concei' able in cases
where, through absence, mistake, or ignorance, the mortgagor may not
have actually known of the sale, and hence have given no notice or
indication that the sale was wrongful before an innocent purchaser for
value bought. If, in addition, the mortgagee who has perpetrated the
wrong prove insolvent, under North Carolina law as it has been shown
to be, it would seem that an innocent mortgagor would have no remedy.
Albeit this may work hardships in isolated cases, it is submitted that
from the standpoint of logic as well as of social policy, the North Carolina court is entirely consistent in upholding the rights of an entirely
innocent purchaser without notice, as against those of an innocent
mortgagor who through some inadvertence has failed to make use of
the safeguards afforded him in his character of landowner.
A. H. GRAHAM, JR.
Municipal Corporations-Power to Exercise Previous Restraint
on Freedom of Speech and Assembly.
An ordinance forbade public parades or public assemblage in or
upon the public streets, highways, public parks or public buildings of
Jersey City without a permit from the Director of Public Safety, who
could only refuse a permit for the purpose of preventing a riot, disturbances, or disorderly assemblage. The circuit court of appeals,'
2
modifying and affirming the district court, held the ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that it permitted previous restraint upon the
right of freedom of speech in a public place and forbade peacable assemblage except upon terms repugnant to free speech, contrary to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. On certiorari the United States
3
Supreme Court affirmed this decision, with modifications.
" Flake v. High Point Perpetual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 204 N. C. 650, 169 S. E.
223 (1933).
,0Schwartz v. Loftus, 216 Fed. 320 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914); see First Nat. Bank
of Opo v. Wise, 235 Ala. 124, 128, 177 So. 636, 639 (1937); Walker v. Schultz,
175 Mich. 280, 292, 141 N. W. 543, 548 (1913).

'Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 101 F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A.
'Committee for Industrial Organization v. Hague, 25 F. Supp. 127 (D.N. J.
1938).
'Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, - U. S. -, 59 Sup. Ct.
954, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 928 (1939).
3rd. 1939).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

Freedom of assembly was recognized in the English Bill of Rights 4
and has become firmly fixed in the English legal tradition. The colonists brought it with them to America, where it has been secured to the
people against encroachment by the states in at least forty-four state
constitutions. 5 In the beginning it was secured against encroachment
by the National Congress under the First Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. In recent years, United States Supreme Court decisions
have secured it against encroachment by the states under the Fourteenth
7
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
In England and America freedom of speech and assembly have been
limited by the common law prohibitions against riot, rout, unlawful
assembly, and breach of the peace." However, the fear that an assembly
may lead to such consequences does not in itself justify its prevention.0
Blackstone said, "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the
nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints
upon publications, and not in freedom from censure from criminal matter when published."' 1 This doctrine of previous restraint has been
uniformly adopted by the United States Supreme Court."1
Under the doctrine, the Supreme Court has held unconstitutional a
statute which authorized the courts to restrain any publication which
regularly produced scandalous, malicious or defamatory matter,1 2 a
statute taxing newspaper advertisement receipts according to whether
or not the paper had a circulation of twenty thousand,13 and a city ordinance prohibiting distribution of literature on the streets without a permit from the city manager. 14 It has also been indicated that the fact
that publication of certain materials would lead to public disturbances
and breaches of the peace would not justify imposing previous restraint
on the publication. 15 In the instant case the court declared invalid on
'Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 Wixu. & M., sess. 2, c. 2.
'.Jarrett and Mund, The Right of Assembly (1931) 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. REy. 1.
The North Carolina constitutional provision is found in N. C. CoNST. art. 1, §25.
U. S. CoNsT. Amend. I.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S.652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 69 L. ed. 1138 (1925);
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S.380, 47 Sup. Ct. 655, 71 L. ed. 1108 (1927) ; Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625, 75 L. ed. 1357 (1931); DeJonge v.
Oregon, 299 U. S.353, 57 Sup. Ct. 255, 81 L. ed. 278 (1937) ; Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U. S.444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666, 82 L. ed. 949 (1938).
' Jarrett and Mund, loc. cit. supra note 5.
'Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 101 F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A.
3rd, 1939).
4 BL. Comm. *152.
Walsh, Freedom of Speech and Press (1933) 21 GEo. L. J. 161.
12 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625, 75 L. ed. 1357 (1931).
' Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct. 444, 80 L. ed.
660 (1936).
" Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S.444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666, 82 L. ed. 949 (1938).
" See Dearborn Publishing Co. v. Fitzgerald, 271 Fed. 479, 482 (N. D. Ohio

1921).

19391

NOTES AND COMMENTS

its face an ordinance authorizing the Director of Public Safety in Jersey
City to refuse permits for public assemblies "for the purpose of preventing riots, disturbances, or disorderly assemblages". The court said
as to this ordinance: ".... it permits the imposition of previous restraint
upon the right of the indivialual to speak before an assembly of his fellows in a public place. The ordinance therefore prohibits peaceable
assemblage except upon terms repugnant to free speech".'0 The theory
of these cases seems to be that the risks of suppression are greater than
the risks of riot.
In relation to disorderly assembly, state statutes, which, generally,
make it unlawful to be a member of any organization which advocates
industrial or political change by force or violence, have been upheld by
the Supreme Court. 17 The Court has taken the view that such statutes
are presumed to be constitutional unless proved to be an unreasonable
and arbitrary exercise of the police power. Where the indictment is
for the language used advocating such changes by violence, the Court,
after finding the validity of the statute, looks only to find if the language came within the prohibition.' s However, it has been suggested
that the language ought to be tested as to whether it has a clear and
present danger to bring about the substantive evils which the state has
a right to prevent. 19
Public authorities thus required to run the risk of riot in the effort
to give life and meaning to the constitutional guaranties of free speech
and assembly may, nevertheless, take legal measures to reduce the risk.
The great majority of cases take the view that a permit may be required
in order to use public property for lawful assemblies, 20 but the standards
which should govern the issuance of these permits are not clearly defined. The courts agree that a city may require a permit to protect its
streets and parks from congestion and interference with normal use
when this is the primary consideration of the ordinance.2 1 Most of the
18 Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 101 F. (2d) 774, 782 (C. C.
A. 3rd,
1939).
17 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 69 L. ed. 1138 (1925) ;
Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 47 Sup. Ct. 641, 71 L: ed. 1095 (1927);
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 47 Sup. Ct. 655, 71 L. ed. 1108 (1927).
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 69 L. ed. 1138 (1925).
See dissenting opinion in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 672, 45 Sup.
Ct. 625, 632, 69 L. ed. 1138, 1148 (1925) ; concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S.357, 372, 47 Sup. Ct. 641, 647, 71 L. ed. 1095, 1104 (1927).
20 Davis v. Massachusetts. 167 U. S. 43, 17 Sup. Ct. 731, 42 L. ed. 71 (1897);
Fitts v. Atlanta, 121 Ga. 567. 49 S. E. 793 (1905) ; Commonwealth v. Abrahams,
156 Mass. 57, 30 N. E. 79 (1892) ; Love v. Phelan, 128 Mich. 545, 87 N. W. 785
(1901); People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364 (1921);

note, The Hague Injunction Proceedings (1938) 48

YALE

L. J. 257.

Sullivan v. Shaw, 6. F. Supp. 112 (S. D. Cal. 1934) (ordinance requiring
permit from city council to parade on certain streets) ; In re Flaherty, 105 Cal.
558, 38 Pac. 981 (1895) (ordinance prohibiting beating of drums and certain other
loud noises on ithe streets without permission of the police) ; State v. Coleman,
21

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

ordinances requiring permits leave the granting and denying thereof to
certain officials without laying down any rules for guidance. A number
of cases have held such ordinances unconstitutional since they leave the
22
issuance of permits to the arbitrary discretion of one person or group.
The majority view, however, is that these ordinances are constitutional. 23 It has been suggested, however, that limitations on the exercise of discretion are to be implied, the discretion being confined to
considerations of the normal use of the streets and parks or other reasonable considerations. 24 It has also been held that the exercise of
discretion is subject to review by the courts, 2 5 so that it would seem
that, even under this view, the issuing official may not act merely from
whim or caprice. Such ordinances must be uniform and apply equally
to all persons similarly situated, 26 so various ordinances excepting
96 Conn. 190, 113 At. 385 (1921) (ordinance prohibiting making of speeches on
the streets except by permission of the chief of police) ; Fitts v. Atlanta, 121 Ga.
567, 49 S. E. 793 (1905) (ordinance forbidding public meetings in the streets
without consent from the mayor and council or mayor and chairman of board of
police commissioners) ; Burkitt v. Beggans, 103 N. J. Eq. 7, 142 At. 181 (1928)
(ordinance requiring permit to speak on streets); Buffalo v. Till, 192 App. Div.
99, 182 N. Y. Supp. 418 (4th Dep't. 1920) (ordinance prohibiting participation in
any parade or assembly which had not been authorized by written permit from
mayor); People ex reL. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364 (1921)
(ordinance requiring permit from mayor to hold public meetings in the street) ;
Duquesne v. Fincke, 269 Pa. 112, 112 Atl. 130 (1920) (ordinance requiring permit
from mayor to make speeches on the streets) ; see Anderson v. Tedford, 80 Fla.
376, 379, 85 So. 673, 674 (1920) (ordinance prohibiting public meetings on streets
without consent of mayor or majority of city councilmen); Commonwealth v.
Abrahams, 156 Mass. 57, 60, 30 N. E. 79 (1892) (rule of park board that there
could be no orations in the park without their prior consent).
2 State v. Coleman, 96 Conn. 190, 113 Atl. 385 (1921); Chicago v. Trotter,
136, Ill. 430, 26 N. E. 359 (1891) ; Anderson v. Wellington, 40 Kan. 173, 19 Pac.
719 (1888) ; In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396, 30 N. W. 72 (1886) ; In re Garrabad, 84
Wis. 585, 54 N. W. 1104 (1893).
" Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U. S. 43, 17 Sup. Ct. 731, 42 L. ed. 71 (1897)
(ordinance requiring permit to use Boston Common to make speeches, etc.) ; I;
re Flaherty, 105 Cal. 558, 38 Pac. 981 (1895); Coughlin v. Chicago Park Dist.,
364. Ill. 90, 4 N. E. (2d) 1 (1936) (ordinance prohibiting public speeches and
meetings in Soldiers' Field without permit, and forbidding use to speak on controversial political and economic subject) ; Love v. Phelan, 128 Mich. 545, 87
N. W. 785 (1901) (ordinance prohibiting public addresses within a half mile
radius of the city hall except by permission of mayor) ; People ex rel. Doyle v.
Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364 (1921) ; note, The Hagite Injunction Proceedings (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 257. In a number of cases no mention is made of the
fact that issuance of permits was left to the discretion of one or more officials, the
courts apparently assuming the ordinance to be valid on this point. Fitts v. Atlanta, 121 Ga. 567, 49 S. E. 793 (1905) ; Burkitt v. Beggans, 103 N. J. Eq. 7, 142
At]. 181 (1928) ; Roderick v. Whitson, 51 Hun. 620, 4 N. Y. Supp. 112 (1889).
2" See Coughlin v. Chicago Park Dist., 364 Ill. 90, 111, 4 N. E. (2d)
1, 10
(1936) ; Love v. Phelan, 128 Mich. 545, 551, 87 N. W. 785, 788 (1901) ; People
ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 102, 133 N. E. 364, 366 (1921).
2 People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364 (1921).
2' Fitts v. Atlanta, 121 Ga. 567, 49 S. E. 793 (1905) ; Anderson v. Wellington,
40 Kan. 173, 19 Pac. 719 (1888) ; In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396, 30 N. W. 72 (1886) ;
People v. Garabed, 20 Misc. 127, 45 N. Y. Supp. 827 (1897); Commonwealth v.
Mervis, 55 Pa. Super. 178 (1913); Commonwealth v. Curtis, 55 Pa. Super. 184
(1913) ; In re Garrabad, 84 Wis. 585, 54 N. W. 1104 (1893).
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named groups from their operation have been held invalid.27 However, it has been suggested that this does not necessarily preclude
classification of different types of assemblies and the requiring of permits only for certain types if the classification is reasonable.2 8 In two
cases where permits were refused because of the fear of riot or disorder,
the action of the issuing authority was upheld, 29 and the ordinance in
the instant case was upheld in a state court mandamus proceeding. 0
However, in the light of the othei permit cases, these three cases appear
to ,be out of line.
W. 0. CooKE,.

Torts-Debtor and Creditor-Intentional Infliction of FrightLiability for Resulting Mental and Physical Injury.
A creditor gave to the defendant, a credit reporting agency, a debt
for collection which was owed the creditor by the plaintiff, the operator
of a dry-cleaning establishment. The plaintiff was suffering from high
blood pressure, due to which he had lost, but was slowly recovering,
his sight; to effect a recovery it was necessary that he be free from
worry and excitement. The defendant sent the debtor three letters
containing threats of action which would be taken by the defendant
and the creditor if the debt were not paid; namely, the reporting by
the defendant of the plaintiff's "poor pay" record to the members of
its credit association, and the institution by the creditor of some of the
various legal proceedings open to creditors. The plaintiff suffered a
relapse upon receipt of the letters, and sued for damages, alleging
malicious intent on the part of the defendant. The defendant's demurrer was sustained in the lower court, but overruled in the circuit
court, on the ground that to indulge in conduct intended or likely to
2 Anderson v. Wellington, 40 Kan. 173, 19 Pac. 719 (1888) (ordinance forbidding parades and assemblages on the streets without consent of mayor except
funerals, fire companies, state militia, and United States troops); it -re Frazee,
63 Mich. 396, 30 N. W. 72 (1886) (ordinance requiring a permit from mayor
and councilmen -to hold a parade with the exception of funeral and military processions); Commonwealth v. Mervis, 55 Pa. Super. 178 (1913) (ordinances forbidding parades and assemblages on the streets -without notifying the police, except
the National Guard, fire and police departments, and Grand Army of the Republic) ;'In re Garrabad, 84 Wis. 585, 54 N. W' 1104 (1893) (ordinance forbidding
marching on certain streets without written consent of the mayor except fire companies, state militia, and funeral processions, and providing that no permit could
be refused to any political party having a regular state organization).
38 People ex tel. O'Connor v. Smith, 263 N. Y. 255, 188 N. E. 745 (1934)
(ordinance requiring permit only for public worship on the streets and not for
other types of assemblages).
"Sullivan v. Shaw, 6 F. Supp. 112 (S. D. Cal. 1934) (however, this decision
was based also on the fact that the parade for which the permit was requested
might congest traffic) ; Coughlin v. Chicago Park Dist., 364 Ill. 90, 4 N. E. (2d)
1 (1936) (this decision was based partly on the ground that all parties were not
properly before the court).
"0Thomas v. Casey, 121 N. J. L. 185, 1 A. (2d) 866 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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cause physical illness is actionable. The majority of the court passed
over the question of the effect of the demurrer as to the plaintiff's
allegation of lack of justification, apparently assuming that the effect
was to admit the truth of the allegation. However, the dissenting judge
was of the opinion that lack of justification not only was not admitted,
but that the facts which were admitted would not Warrant such a
conclusion.'
At common law, the only protection which was given to mental
tranquillity itself was that afforded in the action for assault, a highly
specialized form of intentional harm. 2 However, if the mental disturbance accompanied an independent tortious act, recovery would be
allowed for the disturbance, as well as for any physical injury resulting
therefrom. 3 Thus, when a creditor engages in conduct which constitutes a recognized tort, such as assault,4 battery, 5 false imprisonment,
libel, T slander, 8 invasion of privacy, etc., the primary question is
whether the technical requirements of the particular tort alleged have
been fulfilled. If so, the accompanying mental suffering may be considered in estimating the damages.10
1

Clark v. Assoc. Retail Credit Men, 105 F. (2d) 62 (App. D. C. 1939).

2 Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N. E. 657 (1898) ; Spade v. Lynn & B. R. R.,

168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897) ; Lehman v. Brooklyn City Ry., 47 Hun 355
(N. Y. 1888) ; Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896);
Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C., C., & St. L. Ry., 147 Pa. 40, 23 At. 340 (1892) ; Lynch
v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577 (1861) ; Victorian Ry. Comm. v. Coultas, 13 A. C. 222
(1888) ; see Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 20, 81 N. W. 1003, 1009 (1900) ; I
COOLEY, TORTS (3d ed. 1906) §94 (".. . mere mental pain and anxiety arc too
vague for legal redress where no injury is done to person, property, health or
reputation."); HARPER, LAW OF TORTS (1933) §§18, 67; RESTATEMENT, TORTS
(1934) §46.
3 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ferguson, 157 Ind. 64, 60 N. E. 674 (1901);
Holdorf v. Holdorf, 185 Iowa 838, 169 N. W. 737 (1918) ; Meagher v. Driscoll,
99 Mass. 281, 96 Am. Dec. 759 (1868) ; Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N. W.
238 (1891) ; Beaulieu v. Great Northern Ry., 103 Minn. 47, 114 N. W. 353 (1907)
Barbee v. Reese, 60 Miss. 906 (1883) ; Hickey v. Welch, 91 Mo. App. 4 (1901)
Kurpgeweit v. Kirby, 88 Neb. 72, 129 N. W. 177 (1910); Davidson v. Lee, 139
S. W. 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911); Newell v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589 (1880) ; Summerfield v. Western Union Tel. Co., 87 Wis. 1, 57 N. W. 973 (1894); RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §47(b) ; notes (1920) 6 A. L. R. 1062, (1926) 40 A. L. R.
297.
"Stockwell v. Gee, 121 Okla. 207, 249 Pac. 389 (1926). In Whitsel v. Watts,
98 Kan. 508, 159 Pac. 401 (1916), the facts would seem to constitute an assault,
but the court does not so name it.
'Davis v. Lindsay Iurniture Co., 19 La. App. 169, 138 So. 439 (1931).
' Davidson v. Lee, 139 S.W. 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) ; Salisbury v. Poulson,
51 Utah 552, 172 Pac. 315 (1918).
' Holtz v. National Furniture Co., 57 F. (2d) 446 (App. D. C. 1932); McCravy v. Schneer's, 47 Ga. App. 703, 171 S.E. 391 (1933) ; Estes v. Sterchi Bros.
Stores, 50 Ga. App. 619, 179 S. E. 222 (1935) ; McClain v. Reliance Life Ins.
Co., 150 S. C. 459, 148 S.E. 478 (1929) ; notes (1919) 3 A. L. R. 1596, (1928)
55 A. L. R. 971.
'Galloway v. Cox, 172 S.C. 101, 172 S.E. 761 (1934).
' Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927) ; Judevine v. Benzies
Montanye
Fuel & Warehouse Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269 N. W. 295 (1936).
1
Rogers v.Williard, 144 Ark. 587, 223 S. W. 15 (1920), 11 A. L. R. 1115
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The problem presented by the principal case is that of intentional
infliction of mental disturbance followed by physical injury, no independent tort action existing. Wilkinson v. Downton" is probably the
root of the few pure cases of intentional infliction of mental suffering
which are to be found, other than those in which there was an actual
assault. It is usually treated as a case of intentional harm, but as is
true of practically all of these cases, the physical injury for which recovery was sought was not actually intended, although some injury
should have been anticipated by the defendant, and he did intend to
do the act which caused the injury. The theory of Wilkinson v. Downton may be illustrated by the words of Justice Wright, who wrote the
opinion: "The defendant has, as I assume for the moment, wilfully
done an act calculated to cause physical harm to the plaintiff-that is to
say, to infringe her legal right to personal safety, and has in fact
thereby caused physical harm to her. That proposition without more
appears to me to state a good cause of action, there being no justification
alleged for the act."' 2

It will be observed that there are two important

elements present in this formula: (1) whether there was an undue risk
of serious physical consequences from the defendant's act, and (2)
13
whether the act of the supposed wrongdoer was justified.
Where the creditor's intentional acts do not constitute a tort in themselves and have resulted in fright alone, or fright followed by physical
injury, the cases appear to be split. Those which have allowed recovery
have done so not on the Wilkinson v.Downton theory, but on the basis
that damages may be recovered for mental suffering itself when the
defendant's conduct has been wilful, wanton, malicious, wrongful, with
an utter disregard of consequences, and would naturally cause inental
(1921); Lyons v. Smith, 176 Ark. 728, 3 S. W. (2d) 982 (1928); Kitchens v.

Williams, 52 Ga. App. 422, 183 S. E. 345 (1935); Duncan v. Donnell, 12 S.W.
sd note 3, supra.
811 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); see
1(1897) 2 Q. B. 57.
12

(1936)

Id. at 58. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts

49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, at 1058: "We would expect, then, the gradual
emergence of a broad principle somewhat to this effect: that one who, without
just cause or excuse, and beyond all the bounds of decency, purposely causes a
disturbance of another's mental and emotional tranquillity of so acute a nature
that harmful physical consequences, might be not unlikely to result, is subject to
liability in damages for such mental and emotional disturbance even though no
demonstrable physical consequences actually ensue."
1" The formula proposed is really nothing more than the negligence formula
with a safety valve tacked on in the way of "justification" to protect a defendant
where his act was necessary for the protection of his rights or for the protection
of the rights of another. There is need for such protection where the acts of
the defendant are necessary, or have positive economic value, and the good to be
achieved by the acts is greater than the harm apt to ensue therefrom. The court
in Wilkinson v. Downton, after finding that the elements of the formula had been
satisfied, then imputed to the defendant an intention to cause the physical injury.
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and/or physical suffering.' 4 This "wilful wrong" rule is applied regardless of the existence of physical injury resulting from the mental
disturbance. Actually, however, there are very few collection cases
where recovery was allowed in the absence of physical injury. 1 Usually
there are threats of illegal action made by letter 16 or personally and in
a violent manner.17 One novel method used was the withholding of
cremation of the corpse of plaintiff's son.' 8 Many plaintiffs suffer miscarriage, or an aggravation of an existing condition easily apprisable by
the actor, although the physical injury alleged in the cremation case
was merely shock and a loss of weight.
Although some physical injury actually resulted in most of these
cases, this rule carried to its logical conclusion, assuming it to mean
that intentionally caused mental disturbance is actionable, would lead
to ridiculous conclusions; the courts would be flooded with cases involving nothing more than hurt feelings. Therefore, as a practical
matter, the rule must contain in it some place for drawing the line.
On the other hand, recovery has been denied in a number of cases
even when physical injury has resulted as a direct consequence of the
fright. One reason given is that the defendant could not reasonably
be expected to have foreseen the physical consequences of the fright
produced by his allegedly wrongful acts. In one of these cases a landlord used violent language while on the tenant's property, resulting in
St. Vitus' dance, and in another a salesman tried to coerce the plaintiff
to.buy a vacuum cleaner she did not want, resulting in apoplexy.' 0 One
court places its decision squarely on the ground that there is no recov"4Engle v. Simmons, 148 Ala. 92, 41 So. 1023 (1906); Herman Saks & Sons
v. Ivey, 26 Ala. App. 240, 157 So. 265 (1934); American Security Co. v. Cook,
49 Ga. App. 723, 176 S. E. 798 (1934) ; Interstate Life & Acc. Co. v. Brewer, 56
Ga. App. 599, 193 S. E. 458 (1937) ; Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa
1303, 242 N. W. 25 (1932) ; Patapsco Loan Co. v. Hobbs, 129 Md. 9, 98 Atl. 239

(1916) ; LaSalle Extension University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N. W. 424,
91 A. L. R. 1491 (1934) ; Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N. C. 808, 188
S. E. 625 (1936) ; Gadbury v. Bleitz, 133 Wash. 134, 233 Pac. 299 (1925).
" Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N. W. 25 (1932);
LaSalle Extension University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N. W. 424 (1934).
6Herman Saks & Sons v. Ivey, 26 Ala. App. 240, 157 So. 265 (1934); Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N. W. 25 (1932); LaSalle
Extension
University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N. W. 424 (1934).
17
Engle v. Simmons, 148 Ala. 92, 41 So. 1023 (1906); Atlanta Hub Co. v.
Jones, 47 Ga. App. 778, 171 S. E. 470 (1933); American Security Co. v. Cook,
49 Ga. App. 723, 176 S. E. 798 (1934) ; Interstate Life & Acc. Co. v. Brewer, 56
Ga. App. 599, 193 S. E. 458 (1937); Patapsco Loan Co. v. Hobbs, 129 Md. 9,
98 Atl. 239 (1916) ; Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N. C. 808, 188 S. E.
625 (1936).
Gadbury v. Bleitz, 133 Wash. 134, 233 Pac. 299 (1925).
"Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N. E. 657 (1898) (St. Vitus' dance);
Oehler v. Bamberger & Co., 4 N. J. Misc. 1003, 135 At. 71 (1926), aff'd, 103
N. J. L. 703, 137 Atl. 425 (1927) (apoplexy); cf. Doherty v. Mississippi Power
Co., 178 Miss. 204, 173 So. 287 (1937).
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cry for fright without impact or precedent physical injury,20 relying on
the decision in a practical joke case 2l where the defendant was a halfwit. Another court 22 holds that the defendant did not intend to cause
mental suffering, could not have foreseen the fright and physical injury
which resulted, and was justified in making to the plaintiff a simple
statement of purpose based on a clear legal right. In that case, the
defendants personally told plaintiff, who was eight months advanced in
pregnancy, that if her mortgaged furniture was not paid for they would
move it out. This was done in a calm manner in plaintiff's living room.
In all but one 23 of the cases denying recovery, on the facts, some justification for the defendant's acts might be found, satisfying the second
element of the formula proposed. It would seem, also, that the courts
denying recovery, by using the foreseeability test have treated the question of physical injury caused by fright in the same way that a negligence question would be treated, thus considering the first element of
the formula.
In practically all the decided cases dealing with intentionally caused
fright, whether collection cases or not, the need for applying the Wilkinson v. Downton formula has not arisen. This is because the defendant's conduct has been so apt to cause serious physical consequences
that the need for considering justification has been subjugated to the
more important duty of the courts to protect the plaintiff's interest in
freedom from bodily harm caused by fright. This is probably the reason that the "wilful -wrong" rule has been satisfactory in most instances
where it has been applied. But in a close case, such as the principal
one, where the defendant's conduct is not so clearly "wilful", the question of justification deserves more consideration. The very existence
of a debt should give rise to this consideration in the collection cases.
The principal case, although it professed to follow the doctrine of
Wilkinson v. Downton, failed to consider the question of justification,
and held the defendant liable on the grounds of intentional infliction
of mental harm which should have been expected to result in serious
physical consequences, i.e., the old "wilful wrong" rule. As a matter
of fact, however, the debt was not disputed, the threats were merely
of legal action, and the tone of the letters was very mild, so that it
would seem that the defendant was justified in taking this course of
action.
Just how far a creditor may go in dunning a debtor has not yet
"Alexander v. Pacholek, 222 Mich. 157, 192 N. W. 652 (1923).
"Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N. W. 335 (1899).
"Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. v. Harwell, 82 P.. (2d) 994 (Okla. 1938).
"Oehler v. Bamberger & Co., 4 N. J. Misc. 1003, 135 Atl. 71 (1926), aff'd,
103 N. J. L. 703, 137 AtI. 425 (1927).
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been specifically decided: The principal case, although doing lip-service
to the right of a creditor to inflict some worry and concern, would
seem to restrict the field of action considerably. It is to be hoped that
the question of whether the creditor has acted justifiably, for which inquiry there is already precedent, 24 will be given more weight in the
future.
SAMUEL

R. LEAGER.

Wills--Compromise of Caveat Proceedings-Right to Share
in Proceeds of Compromise.
Plaintiffs and defendants were heirs-at-law of one Smith who died
leaving a will under which a $35,000 note was bequeathed to one
Brawley, a stranger to the blood. Defendants notified plaintiffs of
their intention to contest the will and upon being informed by plaintiffs that they would have nothing to do with the proceedings, filed a
caveat. Defendants then effected a secret compromise with the legatee
whereby they received $15,000 from him in consideration of their withdrawal from the contest. Plaintiffs brought this action to recover
$5,000 claiming that they would have been entitled to one-third of the
estate had the will been set aside. Held, a contract to compromise a
caveat proceeding is valid, and as defendants received the money by
virtue of their contract with Brawley, and not by virtue of the laws of
descent and distribution, the plaintiffs were not entitled to a share
therein.'
It is the majority rule that a contest of a will may -be compromised
by the parties to the proceedings2 if there is no fraud or collusion involved,3 and if the parties compromise nothing beyond their own interests. 4 The courts supporting this rule base their holdings on'the ground
that they do not wish to encourage litigation, and, since the legatees
under a will cannot be made to accept their legacy, they are entitled to
settle disagreements with parties having a valid claim to a caveat, before
a will is probated in solemn form. These courts hold that since caveat
proceedings are in rem, and there are actually no adverse parties, any
' Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. v. Harwell, 82 P. (2d) 994 (Okla. 1938);
Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 1312, 242 N. W. 25, 28 (1932):
"... the door to recovery should be opened but narrowly and with due caution.
A creditor or his agent has a right to urge payment of a just debt and to threaten

to resort to proper legal procedure to enforce such payment."
"Bailey v. McLain, 215 N. C. 150, 1 S. E. (2d) 372 (1939).
2 Dunham v. Slaughter, 268 IIl. 625, 109 N. E. 673 (1915) ; Baxter v. Stephens,
209 Mass. 459, 95 N. E. 854 (1911) ; Schoonmaker v. Gray, 208 N. Y. 209, 101
N. E. 886 (1913) ; Callaghan v. Corbin, 255 N. Y. 401, 175 N. E. 109 (1931) ; It
re Seip's Estate, 163 Pa. 423, 30 At. 226 (1894).
In re Wickersham's Estate, 138 Cal. 355, 70 Pac. 1076 (1903).
'In re Seip's Estate, 163 Pa. 423, 30 Atl. 226 (1894).
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person cited in the proceedings may withdraw at any time for any
reason.
There are a few states, however, notably Wisconsin, which will not
allow such a compromise of proceedings to contest a will, on the ground
that such a compromise is against public policy, as it amounts to an
illegal contract for the purpose of suppressing evidence in a proceeding
before the court.5 These courts also hold that a caveat proceeding is
inrem, but take the view that since such a proceeding has an effect as
against the whole world, the court will complete the proceeding on its
own motion, the issue having been raised, even though one of the parties
withdraws.
0
In North Carolina any interestea person may file a caveat, but all
7
other persons affected must be cited to "see proceedings" and are bound
by the decision.8 After a caveat has been filed, the court will decide
the issue of devisavit vel non, regardless of objecting parties; and
neither proponent nor contestant may suffer a nonsuit or withdraw the
caveat, nor may the court dismiss the suitY These cases seem to follow
the minority, or Wisconsin, view rather than the majority.
The result of the instant case seems to be inconsistent with the
North Carolina rules governing caveat proceedings. It appears that
the contestants were allowed to do indirectly (compromise the proceedings by withholding evidence), what they could not do directly (compromise by withdrawing the caveat). They were allowed to withdraw
in a body, with the result that there was no evidence presented on the
issue of devisavit vel non. Until the principal case was decided, cases
of family settlement' 0 represented the only instances in which the North
Carolina court allowed any compromise of a dispute over a will, but in
this case, the doctrine clearly does not apply, since the legatee was a
stranger in blood to the testator and to the contestants. Although the
present holding appears inconsistent in principle with the earlier decisions, it is at least arguable that the court has now adopted a sounder
point of view in this particular situation in the light of the reasons
advanced by the courts adopting the majority rule.
"Lazenby v. Lazenby, 132 Ga. 829, 65 S. E. 120 (1909) ; In re Staab's Estate,
166 Wis. 587, 166 N. W. 326 (1918) ; Taylor v. Hoyt, 207 Wis. 520, 24Z N. W.
141 (1932).

N. C_CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §4158.

Id.§4159.
'Redmond v. Collins, 15 N. C. 430 (1834); see Mills v. Mills, 195 N. C. 595,

597, 143 S. E. 130, 132 (1928).

o Hutson v. Sawyer, 104 N. C. 1, 10 S. E. 85 (1889); see Collins v. Collins,
125 N. C_ 98, 104, 34 S.E. 195 (1890) ; In re Westfeldt, 188 N. C. 702, 705, 125

S. E. 531, 533 (1924).

20 Tise v. Hicks, 191 N. C. 609, 132 S.E. 560 (1926); see In re Will of McLelland, 207 N. C. 375, 376, 177 S. E. 19, 20 (1934); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208

N. C. 578, 622, 182 S.E. 341, 347 (1935).
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Assuming that the compromise of a caveat is valid, what effect
does such a compromise have on parties not actively participating in
the caveat or in the compromise? There is very little authority involving this direct point. In re Seip's Estate," a Pennsylvania case, allowed
a party cited inadvertently as a proponent, but who paid part of the
expenses of the contest, to recover a part of the proceeds of the compromise. However, the court said that it was not necessary that the
party claiming part of the compromise money take an active part in the
caveat proceedings, since all persons must be brought in, and, if notice
of the compromise was not given to all interested parties the party not
receiving notice might have the verdict, handed down on the contest
2
proceedings, set aside.1'

In a later Pennsylvania case 13 the plaintiff asked to have an appeal
from probate proceedings reinstated after defendants had compromised
the proceedings. Plaintiff sought relief under a statute14 allowing compromise of will disputes, but which provides that if a compromise is
made without notice to all interested parties, the party not receiving
notice may have the verdict set aside and the caveat reinstated. Plaintiff had received no notice, but failed to have the proceedings reinstated,
for the reason that plaintiff was not an interested party under the act.
However, the court said by way of dictum: "Clearly, active contestants
to a will may not secretly agree to settle their contest to the prejudice
of other parties in interest, whose inactivity may be due to a justified
reliance upon the active parties to see that the contest is prosecuted to
a deliberate conclusion by the court ...likewise where contestants of
a will receive money in virtue of a settlement of the contest, they may
not exclude from a share therein one who is equally entitled, although
not an active contestant of the will and not a party to the settlement."'u
Jenness v. Ambler,16 a New Hampshire case, followed by the court
in the instant case, did not allow recovery when a party who refused
to join in the appeal of the probate later sued to share in the money
paid under a compromise agreement. The court held that it was inequitable to allow the plaintiff to recover when she had a chance to aid
in the appeal and refused to do so. This case is distinguishable from
the principal case because the plaintiff had notice of the compromise and
also refused to sign an agreement drawn up by the heirs-at-law providing for a committee to negotiate with the legatee and for distribution
of the proceeds of any compromise among them, whereas, in the principal case the plaintiff had no notice of the compromise. But the court
" 163 Pa. 423, 30 At. 226 (1894).
12 Id. at 433, 30 Atl. at 227.
" In re Crawford's Estate, 320 Pa. 444, 182 Atl. 252 (1936).
1" PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 20, §787.
" See In re Crawford's Estate, 320 Pa. 444, 447, 182 Atl. 252, 253 (1936).
16 62 N. H. 569 (1883).
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in Jenness v. Ambler made no mention of the effect of notice on the
plaintiff's right to recover, basing its decision solely on the plaintiff's
refusal to join in the contest in any way.
Of the 'two views, apparent in these cases, the better rule would
seem to be that which allows a party having no notice of the compromise to recover a part of the proceeds thereof, even though such party
did not engage in the caveat. If the caveat had been prosecuted to a
successful conclusion, such party would have shared in the proceeds,
therefore he should share in the compromise. Even if he is allowed to
reinstate the proceedings, it is possible that he might have no evidence
on which to base a caveat. This rule would also serve to prevent one
group of heirs-at-law from defrauding another group by making a
secret compromise with the legatee.
On the other hand, where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff has
an opportunity to participate in the caveat and refuses, it may be argued
that he is in no position to demand participation in the benefits produced
by the diligence of the caveator, even though the benefits of the caveat
would have enured to the plaintiff if the proceeding had been prosecuted
to a successful conclusion.
The better result might be achieved by the adoption in North Carolina of a statute similar to the Pennsylvania act. 1 7 However, such a
statute should state clearly whether the party not receiving notice of
the compromise is confined to the remedy of reinstatement of the proceedings or whether such a party might also sue for a share in the
proceeds of the compromise.
FRANK
'7

PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 20, §7870

N.
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